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PREFACE

“The life of the Law has not been logic, it has been
experience (…). The Law embodies the story of a nation’s
development through many centuries, and it cannot be
dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and
corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know
what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it
tends to become”.
O.W. HOLMES1

Foreign direct investment, henceforth denoted FDI, constitutes a basic component of
the ongoing economic globalization.

The latter phenomenon refers to the increasing

economic interdependence of countries in the sense that today goods, services, capital and
technologies are exchanged or diffused on a truly global market, accompanied by an
unprecedented cross-border flow of human resources. Economic globalization is dynamic. It
evolved and evolves together with, and as a result of, the progressive liberalization processes
of international trade and its twin sister, international capital flows. The latter includes FDI,
foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and other financial and currency flows.

1

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, Dover Publications, 1991 (1881).
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The concept of foreign investment implies a transnational flow of investment capital
from one country, the source or home country, to another, the host country. To distinguish
between those investments by which a foreign investor acquires a long-term interest and a
significant decision-making influence on an economic entity in a host country, and crossborder investment transactions that do not result in acquiring such a controlling stake, the
terms FDI and respectively FPI are used.

A firm’s qualification as multinational or

transnational enterprise implies that it sources FDI. The main forms that FDI takes are
greenfield investments and international mergers and acquisitions (M&A).

The aforementioned ongoing liberalization processes occur on the global, the regional
and the national levels. The international context impacts the contents and evolution of
national FDI frameworks in essential ways. At the global level, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the
World Bank (WB), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and
the World Trade Organization (WTO) arguably constitute the most influential international
governmental organizations in this field, and often the most prominent protagonists of further
economic liberalization. Although the WTO and its predecessor, the GATT-structure, focus on
trade liberalization, their impact on investment liberalization is considerable, which is in part
the logical result of the close relationship and interaction between international trade and
investment, which reciprocally contribute to each others expansion. Moreover, since the 2001
Doha Conference several developed countries intensified their efforts to render the WTO a
framework of multilateral negotiations on the liberalization of foreign investment, hoping
such negotiations would lead to the adoption of an extensive, binding and liberal multilateral
FDI Agreement.

8

At the regional level, liberalization of trade and investment occurred in the context of a
wide variety of organizations and structures. The most important ones being the following:
the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Mercado
Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA), the Comunidad Andina (CAN), the Caribbean Community
(CARRICOM), the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA) and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and its South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the
Gulf (CCASG). These structures, as well as a growing number of instruments regarding or
related to investment, do affect the pattern or the volume of FDI.

International customary law has a limited role in the field of foreign investment, and is
not one of the motors of the currently ongoing investment liberalization processes. Bilateral
investment treaties (BIT’s), on the other hand, do considerably influence the pattern and
volume of FDI. A substantial proliferation of such instruments has been observed over the
recent years. A key role of BIT’s is to facilitate investment by guaranteeing investment
protection and investment liberalization in general. Consequently, BIT’s render a country’s
investment climate more stable, reliable and attractive for the investors that can prevail on
these instruments. The investment protection and/or liberalization roles of BIT’s are thus
essentially aimed at liberalizing the FDI climate of developing countries.

Indeed, the

industrialized countries typically already have a liberal investment climate.

At the national level, a large variety of FDI policies exist. These policies are reflected
and translated in the national legal and regulatory frameworks, which often include a series of

9

general investment laws and regulations. Some countries even organized the pertinent rules
in a consolidated investment code. In contrast, in some States, the investment rules are spread
out in a wide variety of different non investment-specific instruments and sector-specific acts.
Laws and regulations on FDI are nevertheless not the only factors of a State’s policy and legal
framework that impact the volume and pattern of inflowing foreign investment. To be sure,
many other factors can potentially influence the volume of inbound FDI. A few examples of
such factors are the local antitrust regulation, the intellectual property regime, the tax regime,
the stringency of the labor and environmental protection laws, the proceeding with
privatisation of state-owned enterprises, the existence of anti-corruption laws and the
efficiency of their implementation. Moreover, apart from the specific contents of the FDI
framework and related legal fields of a host state, many other determinants influence
investor’s decision to move their capital across borders and to a particular location. A few
can be mentioned: the desire to acquire direct access to a specific national market or region;
the participation by the target host country in a specific free trade arrangement; the presence
of appropriate infrastructure; the availability of skilled and productive labor force or the
pecuniary advantage of lower labor costs; political stability, the stability and transparency of
the legal and regulatory framework; and the availability and cost of energy and primary
materials.

FDI law also includes the rules applied by the source country to investment outflows.
Many countries owe their economic well-being to a certain extent to outbound FDI. Amongst
the benefits resulting from it for the source economy are the investment profits that flow back
as well as the increased accessibility to resources such as primary materials. Restrictions on
outbound FDI are substantially less common and less extensive than restrictions and barriers
on inbound FDI.

10

Inflows of FDI are often important and sometimes essential for a country’s economy.
This explains why most countries have policies that are FDI hospitable, at least to a certain
extent. Those countries consider that FDI plays an important role in the prosperity of its
population as a result of the fact that on balance its positive consequences and spillovers
outweigh the negative impacts on the host economy. The potential benefits can take many
forms such as, but not limited to, the stimulation of economic growth in general, increase of
local durable employment, training of the local labor force, transfers of technology and
management know how, increase of tax revenues, increased access to export markets and
consequently of export volume, intensified domestic competition, increase of international
competitiveness of the local entities and increased access to credit.

Many countries are nevertheless also to a certain extent skeptical and sometimes even
reluctant towards far-reaching investment liberalization. The rationale of the latter policies
can mainly be found in concerns about loss of national control over the local economy and the
potential adverse effect of FDI. It cannot be denied that the connection between FDI and
local growth is not automatic but depends on many factors. The impact of FDI can especially
be double-edged and uneven in the economies of developing countries. The tension between
benefits and risks of FDI translates in many national frameworks, where rather liberal and
rather FDI restrictive provisions co-exist, the final purpose of this being to render the inflows
of FDI as beneficial and productive as possible for the host economy. FDI restrictions can
take many forms: exclusion of certain sectors or sub-sectors, preferential treatment to
domestic investors, establishment of a cap on foreign equity ownership or voting rights,
imposing entry conditions and performance requirements.
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The tendency of the last few decades is nevertheless clear: a growing number of
countries evolved or further evolved towards more hospitable FDI climates; i.e., towards
more openness for inward FDI. This progressive shift towards more liberal investment
regimes often translated in numerous successive legislative and regulatory changes: more
protection for foreign investors and their investments, the reduction or elimination of the
differences of treatment between foreign and local investors, the reduction of entry and
establishment conditions, the liberalization of the foreign exchange regulations and the
promotion of FDI by incentives. Several countries even increasingly compete between each
other in order to attract the largest share of FDI, especially productive FDI. This competition
can take many forms such as tax concessions, subsidies, the establishment of FDI promotion
agencies or the improvement of the country’s infrastructural facilities.

The fact that the legal and regulatory FDI framework of many countries have been
quasi-permanently evolving during the last decades has been quantified by the UNCTAD.
According to one of its reports, 138 national regulatory changes occurred in the field of FDI
during the year 1996. Of these changes, 122 liberalized, further liberalized or promoted such
inflows2.

In the large majority of cases regulatory changes thus move the countries

frameworks towards further liberalization of the existing FDI restrictions.

This is well

illustrated by the case of China, which in 1984 slightly opened its borders for FDI, and ever
since its legislation evolved and continues to evolve towards further openness. Moreover,
China’s accession in December 2001 to the WTO can be considered as rendering definitive
this ongoing trend of integrating its economy in the global economic framework. The case of

2

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, Investment promotion and suggested measures
to further development objectives, Trade and Development Board, Commission on Investment, Technology and
Related Financial Issues, Expert meeting on Investment Promotion and Development Objectives
(TD/B/COM.2/EM.2/2), July 1997, 3.
12

China also clearly demonstrates the impact of international organizations and international
instruments on the liberalization of international trade and capital flows.

The growing consensus on the role and impact of FDI on the prosperity and
development of a country, and its translation in the national policies and regulations, also
explains how FDI evolved from the 1960’s from an initially geographically restricted
phenomenon, with the developed countries as both the dominant providers and recipients of
FDI, into a truly worldwide reality. However, the developed countries remain presently the
major providers and recipients of FDI flows: they provide for, and receive, three-fourths of
the flows. In the last three decades there was, moreover, a spectacular increase of the
amounts of FDI flows. According to the data of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) FDI inflows represented in the year 2005 on worldwide level an
amount of 897 billion U.S. $ (573 billion of which flowed into the developed countries). This
is more than tenfold the amount of global FDI inflows in 1980 (55 billion) and more than
threefold the 1990 amount (240 billion). FDI activity underwent several other significant
changes over the years, such as the United States shift regarding FDI inflows. Traditionally, a
home country of foreign direct investors, far more than a host country, were increasingly
invaded in the 1980’s and even moreso in the 1990’s by inward FDI flows from European
countries and Japan. Another example of changes in the FDI pattern relates to China, which
in 2004 was the larges recipient of FDI. China, moreover, becomes an increasing provider of
FDI, especially in the sector of energy resources and with a particular focus on African
countries. A non country-specific shift relates to the size of the foreign direct investors: small
and middle-market firms increasingly engage in cross-border investment.
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The variety of inward FDI policies existing on the worldwide level, logically and
necessarily mounts in substantial differences and variations between countries’ legal and
regulatory FDI frameworks. The aforementioned often rapid evolutions, and occasionally,
thorough transformations of national FDI frameworks, render this field of law very dynamic.
As a result a thorough understanding of a country’s current FDI framework is essential,
though not yet sufficient for the decision-making process of a company planning to invest;
i.e., its analysis whether or not a particular FDI system fits the specific strategic corporate
objectives. Not only do we have to know what the national FDI law is today but also ‘what it
has been’ and ‘what it tends to become’. The famous words of Justice Oliver Wendell
HOLMES are indeed particularly applicable in such a dynamic and permanently evolving field
as FDI.

Although inherent uncertainties accompany this kind of business operations,

tomorrow’s forecast of the FDI climate of a country is paramount. William Kissi AGYEBENG’s
position that the law is not only HOLMES’S ‘experience’ but also logic is particularly correct in
the field of FDI 3, which if, for example, demonstrated by the national strategies attracting
productive investment inflows while restricting inflows that might harm the host economy, by
the current tax competition strategies between certain countries, and by contents of the
substantial debates in the international arena between the developed countries protagonists of
further and far-reaching investment liberalization and the counter-arguments of the
developing countries defending national investment laws and policies pursuing better FDI
inflows rather than more, by restricting or conditioning foreign investment.

A country’s FDI framework can theoretically be divided into a certain number of legal
components or determinants, both national as well as international. A thorough understanding
of those elements facilitates the efficient analyzing of national law in this field. Moreover,
3

AGYEBENG, Kissi William, “The Prophecies of the Prophetic Jurist; A Review of Selected Works of Oliver
Wendell Holems, Jr.”, Cornell Law School LL.M. Papers Series, Paper 10, November 2005
(http://lsr.nellco.org/cornell/lps/papers/10).
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those factors constitute as many criteria to measure and define the degree of openness and
attractiveness of a country towards FDI inflows and to compare its legal and regulatory
framework with that of other States. Understanding the interaction between those different
determinants and determining how they can serve to define the specific system of a host
economy and its degree of hospitality towards FDI in comparison with other States constitutes
the main objective of this paper.

The paper is divided into three chapters. The introductory chapter begins with an
analysis of the concept of FDI and its characterizing components, in order to distil a common
denominator from the variations in concrete understanding of the concept in different FDI
frameworks, and also to distinguish that economic phenomenon from other forms of foreign
investment. The second part of the chapter proceeds by typologizing FDI, followed by a
typology of the different kinds of foreign direct investment entities.

These preliminary

conceptualizations are necessary for a perfect understanding of the main determinants of legal
and regulatory FDI frameworks, analyzed in chapters two and three.

Chapter two analyzes the impact of international law and international governmental
organizations on the host countries’ FDI climate. The main international determinants of
national FDI frameworks analyzed in this chapter are international agreements, instruments
and activities of international organizations and regional integration schemes that impact
cross-border investment activity. However, it is important to stress that the international
determinants are inherently interrelated, interdependent and interactive with the national
determinants. Their extraction from the aggregate reality is for analytical purposes only.
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The national determinants of a State’s FDI regime are analyzed in chapter three. The
aforementioned concern of theoretical artificiality is valid as well for the present purposes and
perhaps even more because apart from the interaction between international and national
determinants, the latter are narrowly interrelated and occasionally overlap. In order to analyze
them successively, they will nevertheless be divided in four main categories: the rules
applicable to the entry of FDI, the rules governing the treatment of foreign direct investors
and their investments, the rules on the exit of FDI and finally a remainder category of rules
regarding or impacting FDI.

The objective of the conclusion is to evaluate the interactions within the aggregate of
determinants and to propose a categorization of different existing national FDI frameworks on
the basis of observed regulatory patterns. The understanding of the connections between the
determinants do not only render a material visualization of an FDI regime more
comprehensible, but also renders measurement and comparison of the extent of openness and
attractiveness of different national FDI frameworks more efficient.

In order to pursue the analysis and evaluation of the legal determinants of FDI from a
practical perspective, many references will be made, among each of the chapters, to the
concrete rules of the national regimes of several countries. The references to specific national
provisions will further demonstrate the heterogeneity and often complexity of FDI rules, the
interactions existing between trade and investment, between national and international law
and between FDI rules and other fields of law. The countries that will most be referred to are
the following: Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Brazil, Canada, China, Chile,
Colombia, France, Germany, Ghana , India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates (henceforth denoted UAE), the United Kingdom and the United States
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of America (henceforth denoted US). The objective of the selection is to compare countries
with various types of FDI regimes and with different levels of hospitality towards such
transactions. Consequently, while some of the selected countries have a long tradition of
openness towards FDI, others have taken steps over the last years or decades to progressively
liberalize their FDI laws, which continue to a lesser or larger extent to contain rules which
constitute major barriers to FDI inflows. Although other countries than those selected
amongst the presently 191 independent states could have served the same purposes,
preference for important economies, particular regimes and geographic diversity have, in part,
guided the choices.

17

CHAPTER I.
CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS AND TYPOLOGIES

1.1.

Concepts and Definitions

The concept of cross-border capital movements contains international investment as
well as other types of financial transfers. The IMF distinguishes between three categories of
foreign investment: FDI, FPI and other forms of foreign investment (OFI). FDI and FPI are
the two main forms of international investment. FDI occurs when there is a transfer of
tangible or intangible assets from a natural person or a company whose majority of shares are
directly or indirectly held by natural persons of foreign nationality, into a host country with
the specific purpose “of use in that country to generate wealth under the total or partial
control of the owner of the assets.”4 This definition corresponds with that of SÖDERSTEN and
REED;

it is “the act of purchasing an asset and at the same time acquiring control of it.”

Control by the latter is understood as the acquisition of a significant degree of influence over
the decision making of the direct investment entity5. FPI transactions, on the other hand, do
not result in acquiring a significant degree of influence.

The main forms of OFI are

international loans and trade-related lending.
4

SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2004, 4.
5
SÖDERSTEN, Bo & REED, Geoffrey, International economics, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1994, 501.
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Although the element of control as a determining factor of FDI is clearly present in
many definitions, there is nevertheless a relative lack of uniformity amongst the definitions of
FDI in the different national, legal and regulatory frameworks. Not only are there often
disparities in the existing definition of FDI itself, but many national regulatory systems do not
contain any legal definition of it. Moreover, several national systems apply to foreign
investment in general without distinguishing between FDI and FPI for the purposes of the
entry conditions, the treatment of the foreign investors or the exit of foreign investment. For
example, this is the case in Chile, which has a very hospitable FDI climate. Article 1 of its
Decree-Law 600 on Foreign Investment states: “foreign natural and legal persons, and
Chileans resident and domiciled abroad, who transfer foreign capital to Chile and enter into
a foreign investment contract shall be governed by the provisions of this statute.” The same
can be said of Mexico, whose Foreign Investment Law of 27 December 1993 provides in its
article 2.2. that foreign investment includes the participation of foreign investors in the equity
capital of Mexican companies “in any proportion.”

Amongst the systems that distinguish amongst FDI and other flows of investment
capital, the lack of homogeneity is complicated by the fact that in several systems the
definitions have not been static. Furthermore, it can be observed that there is not even
absolute definitional identicity amongst the different international organizations active in the
field of FDI, although international governmental organizations such as the IMF and the
OEC
D

agree on its definition and actively promote more uniformity amongst national

regulations. Definitional heterogeneity complicates comparisons between the legal and
regulatory FDI frameworks of different countries. It also complicates the measurement of FDI
and comparison of investment statistics. Comparing the extent of hospitality towards FDI of
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countries with diverse understandings of the transactions involved renders such an operation
even more complex.

The concept of control as a determinant of FDI is highlighted in the definitions found
in the frameworks of the IMF and the OECD. Their definitions are the most commonly used
guidelines. The IMF defines the concept in its Balance of Payments Manual as follows:
“Direct investment is the category of international investment that reflects the objective of a
resident entity in one economy obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another
economy. The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the
direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the investor on the
management of the enterprise. Direct investment comprises not only the initial transaction
establishing the relationship between the investor and the enterprise but also all subsequent
transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and
unincorporated.”6 The entity in the home country can be referred to as the ‘direct investor’
and the one in the host country as the ‘direct investment entity’. The OECD, in the guidelines
contained in its Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment,7 applies a
definition with a slightly different formulation though with exactly the same components: a
lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy in an entity located in a host economy,
which is considered to exist when two interdependent and interrelated situations are present:
the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the local entity (as
opposed to a volatile relationship), and a significant degree of influence on the management
of the local entity. It is especially that latter standard that is characteristic of FDI, and the
OECD refers to it as having an ‘effective voice in the management.’ The aforementioned
characteristics are also present in the definition used by the United Nations Statistics Division,
6

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Balance of Payment Manual, Fifth edition, Washington D.C., 1993, 86.
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign
Direct Investment, Third edition, Paris, 1996, 7.

7
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which defines FDI as investments “made to acquire a lasting management interest in an
enterprise operating in a country other than that of the investor, the investor’s purpose being
an effective voice in the management of the enterprise.” 8

However, whereas the definitions of the OECD and the IMF views significant control
as an essential component of the concept, other instruments include in its definition
transactions which are not accompanied by the acquisition of significant decision-making
power on the direct investment entity. For example, several frameworks consider long-term
loans that create a lasting economic link as FDI transactions, although it is clear that the
lending entity has no effective voice in the management of its lender. Such conceptualization
can be found in several national laws and also in Directive 88/361/EEC of the Council of the
European Union, adopted on 24 June 1988.9

The latter supranational instrument qualifies transactions as FDI both on the basis of
the existence of significant influence on the management as well as, alternatively, on the basis
of certain forms of lasting interest not accompanied by control on the foreign direct
investment entity. Annex I of this European directive enumerates as comprised by the concept
of direct investment: “1. Establishment and extension of branches or new undertakings
belonging solely to the person providing the capital, and the acquisition in full of existing
undertakings; 2. Participation in new or existing undertaking with the view to establishing or
maintaining lasting economic links; 3. Long-term loans with a view to establish or
maintaining lasting economic links, 4. Reinvestment of profits with a view to maintaining
lasting economic links” and defines the concept in the Explanatory notes included in the
Annex as “investments of all kinds by natural persons or commercial, industrial or financial
8

UN STATISTICS DIVISION (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb_dict_xrxx.asp?def_code=400).
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article
67 of the Treaty.
9
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undertakings, and which serve to establish or to maintain lasting and direct links between the
person providing the capital and the entrepreneur to whom or the undertaking to which the
capital is made available in order to carry on an economic activity. This concept must
therefore be understood in its widest sense. The undertakings mentioned under 1. of the
Nomenclature include legally independent undertakings (wholly-owned subsidiaries) and
branches. As regards those undertakings mentioned under 2. of the Nomenclature which have
the status of companies limited by shares, there is participation in the nature of direct
investment where the block of shares held by a natural person of another undertaking or any
other holder enables the shareholder, either pursuant to the provisions of national laws
relating to companies limited by shares or otherwise, to participate effectively in the
management of the company or in its control. Long-term loans of a participating nature,
mentioned under 3. of the Nomenclature, means loans for a period of more than five years
which are made for the purpose of establishing or maintaining lasting economic links. The
main examples which may be cited are loans granted by a company to its subsidiaries or to
companies in which it has a share and loans linked with a profit-sharing arrangement. Loans
granted by financial institutions with a view to establishing or maintaining lasting economic
links are also included under this heading.”

The OECD highlights in its guidelines that absolute control by the foreign direct
investor is not required and that it should be considered enough that the investor’s transaction
enables him to participate in, or influence, the management of the direct investment entity,
and considers those conditions evidenced by an ownership of at least 10 percent.10 In other
words, the OECD guidelines recommend States to define FDI in their respective legal and
regulatory frameworks by retaining a threshold of 10 percent; i.e., that the ownership by a
10

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise
Affairs.
Glossary
of
Foreign
Direct
Investment
Terms
and
Definitions
(5
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/1/2487495.pdf , 3).
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direct investor of such percentage of the ordinary shares or voting power of an incorporated
direct investment entity—or the equivalent if it is an unincorporated entity—be considered as
determinative of a direct investment relationship. The Balance of Payment Manual of the IMF
contains the same recommendation. Although the underlying rationale is that the presence of
such percentage of ownership evidences the ability of the direct investor to influence the
management of the enterprise, and although recognizing that in some cases a lower
percentage of ownership of the ordinary shares or voting stock may give the direct investor
substantial decision-making influence while in other circumstances a higher percentage is not
accompanied by any significant influence, the IMF and the OECD stress that they do not
recommend the States to apply the 10 percent threshold in a flexible manner as to fit the
circumstances. Stated otherwise, their guidelines recommend that any ownership or decision
making power of less than 10 percent be not considered as FDI even if the foreign direct
investor has an effective voice in the management, and that a higher percentage leads to FDI
qualification even if the decision-making influence of the investor is not significant or even
nonexistent.

The guidelines of the OECD and the IMF regarding the concept of FDI contribute towards
more homogeneity amongst the different national legal frameworks and facilitates
international comparisons in the FDI field. The definition of FDI proposed by the European
Commission is quasi identical and clearly intentionally copied from the OECD guidelines.11
The recommended threshold of 10 percent can be found in various national legislations.
Colombia, for example, focuses exclusively on the 10 percent foreign ownership threshold
regardless of whether the foreign investors have an effective voice in management.12

11

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the
Council on Community Statistics concerning the Balance of Payments, International Trade in Services and
Foreign Direct Investment, COM(2003) 507 Final, 20 Augustus 2003, Annex II.
12
Resolution 51 of 1991, article 4.
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Consequently, a foreign investor with an effective decision-making power on the management
of the direct investment entity is not considered FDI. Also, the United States Code of Federal
Regulations defines inbound FDI in its section 806.15 as “the ownership or control, directly
or indirectly, by one foreign person of 10 per centum or more of the voting securities of an
incorporated U.S. business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated U.S.
business enterprise, including a branch.”13 The Turkish Law no. 4875 of June 5, 2003,
commonly known as Turkish New Foreign Investment Law, also adopted the 10 percent
threshold for its definition of inwards FDI14.

The Belgian Law on the Balance of Payments and the Foreign Patrimonial Position of
Belgium of 28 February 2002 and the Royal Decree of 19 March 2002 further implementing
the aforementioned law, characterizes foreign direct investment by terms of significant
influence on the management of an investment entity and a lasting interest, but consider the
threshold of 10 percent as a presumption of a direct investment relation rather than
determinative of such a relationship; i.e., it will not always result from the threshold being
present that the investment will be considered as FDI 15.

13

U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade, Subtitle B. Regulations Relating to
Commerce and Foreign Trade, Chapter VIII Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce, Part 806
Direct Investment Surveys, section 806.15 Foreign direct investment in the United States, (a) Specific
definitions.
14
Article 2.b. of Turkish New Foreign Direct Investment Law states: “The terms used in this law shall have the
following meaning: … b) Foreign direct investment: i) Establishing a new company or branch of a foreign
company; ii) Share acquisition, where the foreign investor owns 10 percent or more of the shares or voting
power, by means of, but not limited to the following economic assets: 1) Assets acquired from abroad by the
foreign investor: -) capital in cash in the form of convertible currency bought and sold by the Central Bank of
Turkey, -) stocks and bonds of foreign companies (excluding government bonds), -) machinery and equipment, )industrial and intellectual property rights; 2) Assets acquired from Turkey: -) reinvested earnings, revenues,
financial claims, or any other investment-related rights of financial value, -) commercial rights for the
exploration and extraction of natural resources”.
15
These Belgian Law and Royal Decree pursue statistical purposes. The Member States of the European
Community require from natural and legal persons that they supply certain information with respect to FDI. This
is moreover a EU-requirement and it is in that light that the Proposal of the European Commission on
Community statistics concerning the balance of payments, international trade in services and foreign direct
investment is to be understood (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and the Council on Community Statistics concerning the Balance of Payments,
International Trade in Services and Foreign Direct Investment, COM(2003) 507 Final, 20 Augustus 2003): this
24

However, many of the States whose FDI concept relies on the underlying rationale of
the foreign investor having an effective voice in the management, do not link their definition
to a specific threshold expressed in percentage. The Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act
of 199416 states that FDI is “investment made to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise
operating in the economy of Ghana and intended to give the investor an effective control in
the management of the enterprise.”17 The Andean Community equally omits to refer to a
threshold in the definition of FDI in its Decision 291 on a Common Regime of Treatment of
Foreign Capital, adopted on 22 March 1991.

France’s Monetary and Financial Code18 contains two different definitions of FDI,
each of which corresponds with a specific goal. For statistical purposes FDI is defined by
article R 151-1-4° as the acquisition of at least 10 percent of the capital or the voting rights or
that causes the threshold of 10 percent to be reached or exceeded, as well as all transactions
between affiliated enterprises such as loans and deposits, and all real estate investments.
Along with the statistical definition of FDI, article R 151-1-5° of the Monetary and Financial
Code states that for the purposes of article R 152-5; i.e., a provision establishing the
mandatory general rule that FDI transactions must be declared to the competent
administrative authority,19 FDI is to be understood as: a) the establishment of a new company
by a foreign direct investor20; b) the acquisition of a part of a company by a foreign direct
investor; c) all transactions made by foreign direct investors when such transactions have as a
result that the total amount of capital or voting rights owned by foreign entities exceeds 33,33
proposal contains annexes containing the detailed nature, sources, criteria and periodicity of the information to
be transmitted to the Eurostat division of the European Commission.
16
Enacted by the Parliament of the Republic of Ghana on 19 August 1994.
17
Section 40 of the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act.
18
Articles L 151-1 to L 152-6 of the Monetary and Financial Code deal with foreign investment. Last modified
by Decree nr. 2005-1739 of 30 December 2005.
19
There are nevertheless several exceptions to the general rule of administrative declaration of FDI.
20
This is called a greenfield investment.
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percent of the total capital or voting rights of the investment entity; d) all transactions having
the same result as under (c) when made by a French enterprise whose capital or voting rights
are owned by foreign entities for more than 33,33 percent; e) transactions such as loans,
substantial guaranties or the acquisition of commercial contracts that results in de facto
control by the investment entity by a foreign direct investor. Consequently, in the French FDI
regime, the threshold of 10 percent is used for statistic purposes, while other thresholds or
rules are applicable for the entry procedure. This is another clear example of how complex it
is to compare levels of FDI hospitality.

Despite differences in conceptualizing and defining FDI, most frameworks however
have a common denominator, in the sense that they attribute to it the characteristics of
significant (though not necessary dominant) influence over the investment, which is narrowly
interrelated with the idea of a lasting interest in the entity in the host country.

In the case of foreign portfolio investment transactions (FPI) it is not the purpose of
the investor to exert a significant degree of influence over the management of the investment
entity in the host country. It is precisely this characteristic of having an effective voice in the
management which is the main factor distinguishing FDI from FPI,21 at least from the
perspective of those systems sharing the OECD and IMF’s perspectives. FPI can be qualified
as passive control investment in the sense that the foreign investor does not acquire control on
the object of the investment, accompanied by a more volatile relationship as a result of the
fact that, compared to FDI, the passive investment is usually tradable and can relatively more
easily be withdrawn from the host economy.22 The distinguishing element is thus, in the

21

There are other international flows of assets (e.g. international sales).
FPI mostly takes the form of interest-bearing investments (bonds, commercial paper, certificates of deposit)
and dividend paying investments (stocks, country funds). The United Nations Statistics Division defines the
concept of FPI both by an enumeration and by exclusion i.e. by stating that it is cross-border investment which is
22
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words of SORNARAJAH, that in portfolio investment “there is a divorce between management
and control of the company and the share ownership in it.”23,24 In Ghana the distinction
between both types of foreign investment is stressed in its legislation. The Ghana Investment
Promotion Centre Act defines FPI as investments “in shares or bonds which are mandatory
convertible into share or other securities traded on the Ghana Stock Exchange. … and any
act or contract whereby an investor makes a contribution, whether tangible or intangible, to
an enterprise in Ghana without obtaining an equity interest in the enterprise but is entitled to
returns based on profits generated by the enterprise.” 25

not FDI: “Foreign portfolio investment includes equity securities and debt securities in the form of bonds and
notes, money market instruments and financial derivates such as options. Excluded are any of the instruments
included
in
the
categories
of
direct
investment
and
reserve
assets”
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb_dict_xrxx.asp?def_code=282). The European Commission proposes a very
similar definition of FPI: “Portfolio investment covers transactions in equity and debt securities. Debt securities
are subdivided into bonds and notes, money market instruments, and financial derivatives when the derivatives
generate financial claims and liabilities. Unless they are categorized either as direct investment or as reserve
assets” (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and the Council on Community Statistics concerning the Balance of Payments, International Trade in Services
and Foreign Direct Investment, COM(2003) 507 Final, 20 Augustus 2003, Annex II).
23
SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2004, 4.
24
For more information on the difference between FDI and FPI see: UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), Comprehensive Study of the Interrelationship between Foreign Direct
Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment. June 1999 (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/pogdsdfsbd5.pdf).
25
Section 40 of the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act.
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1.2.

Typologies

1.2.1. Typology of FDI

FDI can take various forms. A distinction can be made between the so-called
greenfield investments, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), reinvestment of earnings and other
kinds of direct investment capital inflows.

The category of greenfield FDI refers to an investment in new assets; i.e., the creation
of an entirely new business entity. The construction of a factory in the host country would for
example be qualified as a greenfield investment. Greenfield FDI can be opposed to an
investment in an already existing business entity which only results in a change of the
ownership of that entity; i.e., a merger or other kind of acquisition. M&A FDI can thus be
defined as an investment by which a foreign investor acquires existing assets in the host
economy.26 The concept of outbound M&A is used when the operation involves a national
buyer and a non-local target, whereas inbound M&A refers to the reverse situation.

Reinvestment of earnings is “the direct investor’s share of earnings not distributed as
dividends by subsidiaries or associates and earnings of branches not remitted to the direct
investor.”27 The definition adopted by UNCTAD in its Glossary defines the concept as “the
part of an affiliate’s earnings accruing to the foreign investor that is reinvested in that

26

CALDERON, Cesar; LOAYZA, Norman and SERVEN, Luis, Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment and Mergers
and Acquisitions: Feedback and Macroeconomic Effects, Policy Research Working Paper, Worldbank, no. WPS
3192, 2 (http://www-wds.worldbank.org).
27
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, Comprehensive Study of the Interrelationship
between Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment., United Nations Publications, Geneva,
June 1999 (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/pogdsdfsbd5.pdf), 4.
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enterprise.”

28

The European Commission qualifies this category of FDI as ‘Reinvested

earnings and undistributed branch profits.’ 29

Other kinds of direct investment capital inflows than greenfield investments, M&A and
reinvested earnings, are generally classified together in a residual remainder category. The
latter category includes for example the transactions by which the direct investor lends funds
or transfers assets to its subsidiary, associate or branch.30 It is to be stressed that FDI does not
only covers the initial transaction but also all subsequent transactions between the foreign
direct investor and the direct investment enterprise.31

While in developed countries FDI predominantly takes the form of M&A, in
developing countries greenfield investments constitutes the major part of FDI operations.
Nevertheless, although both greenfield FDI and M&A FDI have been increasing in volume
over the years, the latter type of investment transactions has increased more significantly in
comparison with the latter, including in developing countries.32 The skeptics towards the
proposition that FDI is on balance positive for the host economy, perceive that particularly
M&A are least likely to lead to economic growth, increase of labor opportunities or transfer of

28

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), Glossary of the UNCTAD
(http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3167&lang=1).
29
The definition proposed by the European Commission is very similar to the one of UNCTAD. It defines
‘reinvested earnings and undistributed branch profits’ as: “reinvested earnings comprise direct investors’
shares -in proportion to equity held- of i) earnings that foreign subsidiaries and associated enterprises do not
distribute as dividends and ii) earnings that branches and other unincorporated enterprises do not remit to
direct investors” (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and the Council on Community Statistics concerning the Balance of Payments, International Trade
in Services and Foreign Direct Investment, COM(2003) 507 Final, 20 Augustus 2003, Annex II).
30
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, Comprehensive Study of the Interrelationship
between Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment, United Nations Publications, Geneva,
June 1999, 4 (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/pogdsdfsbd5.pdf).
31
This is also specifically highlighted by the OECD in its Detailed Benchmark Definitions of Foreign Direct
Investment.
32
CALDERON, Cesar; LOAYZA, Norman and SERVEN, Luis, Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment and Mergers
and Acquisitions: Feedback and Macroeconomic Effects, Policy Research Working Paper, Worldbank, no. WPS
3192, 2 (http://www-wds.worldbank.org).
29

technology, because the transaction does not necessarily results in more than a mere shift
from local to foreign ownership.33
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This skepticism regards mainly FDI in developing countries. For a thorough study of the potential effects of
FDI on host economies, see: MORAN, Theodore H., GRAHAM Edward M., and BLOMSTRÖM Magnus, Does
Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development?, Institute for International Economics, Center for Global
Development, Washington D.C., April 2005. Also: UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), Foreign Direct Investment and Development., United Nations Publications, Geneva,
1999; UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), Should countries promote
foreign direct investment? , United Nations Publications, Geneva, 2001. In the 1992 Guidelines on the Treatment
of Foreign Direct Investment the World Bank doesn’t seem to stress differences of impact on host economies in
function of the type of FDI, as results from its paragraph first: “The Development Committee Recognizing that a
greater flow of foreign direct investment brings substantial benefits to bear on the world economy and on the
economies of developing countries in particular, in terms of improving the long term efficiency of the host
country through greater competition, transfer of capital, technology and managerial skills and enhancement of
market access and in terms of the expansion of international trade”. See also: SINGH, Ajit, Foreign Direct
Investment and International Agreements: A South Pespective, Centre Trade Series Occasional Paper Nr. 6,
2001, 7. The fact that the efforts of developing countries to liberalize FDI primarily results from their intent to
advance the cause of their investors -and the objective of foreign direct investors is to increase their profits-, is
highlighted by SORNARAJAH: “that foreign investment is motivated by altruistic motives of developing the
economy of the host state is … an absurdity. Transnational corporations which make overseas investments are
not charitable institutions doling out largesse but are companies in search of profits” (SORNAJARAH, M., The
International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, 342). For more on
how international organizations such as the WB, the IMF and the WTO could play a role in imposing social and
environmental responsibilities on the multinational companies (in the context of the North-South investment
flows), see: NIEUWENHUYS, E.C., and BRUS, M.M., Multilateral Regulation of Investment, Kluwer Law
International, The Hague, 2001.
30

1.2.2. Typology of foreign direct investment entities

The logical result of the way the IMF defines FDI and the threshold it applies, is that
this IGO understands by a foreign direct investment entity “an enterprise (institutional unit)
in the financial or non-financial corporate sectors of the economy in which a non-resident
investor owns 10 percent or more of the voting power of an incorporated enterprise or has the
equivalent ownership in an enterprise operating under another legal structure.”34 A foreign
direct investor is defined by the OECD as “an individual, an incorporated or unincorporated
public or private enterprise, a government, a group of related individuals, or a group of
related incorporated and/or unincorporated enterprises which has a direct investment
enterprise -that is a subsidiary, associate or branch- operating in a country other than the
country or countries of residence of the direct investor or investors.”35

In both the IMF and OECD guidelines a distinction is made between direct investment
entities which are incorporated in the host country and those who are not. An incorporated
direct investment enterprise may either have the form of a subsidiary (wholly owned or partly
owned) or of an associate company. Branches are unincorporated investment entities which
can also be wholly owned by the foreign direct investor or jointly with a local partner. A joint
venture enterprise does not necessarily take an incorporated structure and can also constitute a
branch.36 The foreign direct investor is not necessarily a business entity; it can also be an

34

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND COMMITTEE ON BALANCE OF PAYMENTS STATISTICS, Definition of Direct
Investment Terms, BOPCOM-05/58, April 2005 (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2005/05-58.pdf). The
definition of the OECD is similar: “an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which a single foreign
investor owns 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power of an incorporated enterprise or the
equivalent of an unincorporated enterprise” (ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, Third edition, Paris, 1996, 7).
35
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Detailed Benchmark Definition of
Foreign Direct Investment, Third edition, Paris, 1996, 7.
36
A joint venture is defined by UNCTAD as follows: “a joint venture involves share-holding in a business entity
having the following characteristics; i) the entity was established by a contractual arrangement (usually in
writing), whereby two or more parties have contributed resources towards the business undertaking; ii) the
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individual.37 The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, as well as several other national systems,
also distinguish between incorporated and unincorporated foreign direct investment entities.
Other systems, such as the Columbian legislation only permit incorporated entities; i.e., the
establishment of unincorporated foreign direct investment entities in Columbia is prohibited.38

Subsidiaries are defined by the IMF in its Balance of Payments Manual 39 as entities in
which a direct foreign investor owns at least 50 percent of the ordinary shares or voting
power. A subsidiary can be wholly owned or partly owned by a foreign direct investor, and in
the latter case its ownership can be between 50 and 100 percent. Although probably leading to
the same qualification in most cases, UNCTAD’s definition of a subsidiary states: “an
incorporated enterprise in the host country in which another entity directly owns more than
half of the shareholder’s voting power, or a shareholder in the enterprise, and has the right to
appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or
supervisory body.”40

An associate company is the concept used when the foreign direct investor owns less
than 50 percent but, at least according to the IMF and the OECD, more than 10 percent
because otherwise the investment is to be qualified as FPI. The absence of definitional
heterogeneity among the different frameworks or organizations is demonstrated again by the

parties have joint control over one or more activities carried out according to the terms of the arrangements and
none of the individual investors is in a position to control the venture unilaterally”. The IGO further makes a
distinction between three kinds of joint ventures: jointly controlled entities, jointly controlled assets, jointly
controlled operations (UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), Glossary of
UNCTAD; http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3176&lang=1).
37
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), Glossary of UNCTAD
(http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3164&bang=1).
38
Resolution 51 of 1991.
39
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Balance of Payments Manual, op. cit., 86. See also ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Glossary of
Foreign Direct Investment Terms and Definitions, Op. cit., 3.
40
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), Glossary of UNCTAD
(http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3173&lang=1).
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fact that UNCTAD defines an associate company as “an incorporated enterprise in the host
country in which an investor, together with its subsidiaries and associates, owns a total of at
least 10 percent, but not more than half, of the shareholders’ voting power. The figure may be
lessthan 10 percent if there is evidence of an effective voice in management.”

41

As a result of

this definition, which indeed stresses that there can be an associate company and thus FDI
even when the 10 percent threshold is not attained, that UNCTAD considers the presence of
an effective voice in management as the essential determinant of FDI, which is consequently
not in line with the recommendations of the OECD and the IMF.

UNCTAD distinguishes four kinds of branches: permanent establishments or offices;
unincorporated partnerships or joint ventures between the foreign direct investor and one or
more third parties; land, structures and/or immovable equipments and objects directly owned
by a foreign resident; mobile equipment operating in the host country for at least a year.42
UNCTAD cites as examples of the latter category ships, aircrafts and gas or oil-drilling rigs.

41
42

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), op. cit.
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), op. cit.
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CHAPTER II.
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL
STRUCTURES ON HOST COUNTRIES’ FDI CLIMATE – INTERNATIONAL
DETERMINANTS

The FDI system of a State is not only determined by national policies and laws. The
international context often significantly impacts the national rules from several perspectives,
and indisputably plays a key role in the ongoing investment liberalization processes.

Basic principles of international law such as the doctrine of state sovereignty are
applicable in the context of foreign investment. The importance of international customary
law is very limited in this field. On the other hand, it is clear that the activities and
instruments of many international governmental organizations, henceforth denoted IGO’s,
oftentimes over the last decades have substantially contributed to national evolutions towards
more FDI hospitality. As a result of the close interaction between international trade and
international investment, which reciprocally contribute to each others expansion43, even
activities or instruments of IGO’s focused on trade liberalization generally have important
spillovers on investment issues. The FDI activity of IGO’s on both the global as on the
regional levels is moreover constantly evolving and increasing.
43

E.g. transnational trade between affiliated firms accounts for at least one third of international trade (SEID,
Sherif H., Global Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, Ashgate, Burlington, 2002, 3; see also the several of
the UNCTAD reports).
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Furthermore, international instruments in general and especially bilateral investment
treaties (BIT’s) clearly exercise significant influence on both the pattern and volume of FDI
streams. An unprecedented proliferation of BIT’s has been observed over the last years. One
of the main objectives of BIT’s is to render the investment climate of developing countries
more reliable and more hospitable for the foreign investors from the developed Contracting
State.

International regional cooperation or integration schemes, although often focused on
trade issues, also increasingly expanded over the years to involve investment issues as well.
However, the impact of the European Union on the FDI climate of its Member States has
been substantial for several decades. The narrow relationship between trade and investment
mentioned above result in similar spillovers in the regional schemes as it does in global
structures.

The objective of the present chapter is to analyze each of these international FDI
determinants. As stressed in the introduction of this paper, a successive discussion of these
determinants, separated from their inherent interaction with national determinants and with
each other, is somehow artificial but nevertheless justified for the analytical purposes.

35

2.1.

International Law and Structures at the Global Level (Including Bilateral
Investment Treaties)

The doctrine of state sovereignty, a basic principle of international law, in the context
of FDI means that a state can decide at its discretion how to regulate foreign investment and
how to treat foreign investors. Consequently, States can freely decide whether to establish a
liberal and hospitable FDI climate, or not. They can prohibit the entry of foreign investment,
establish barriers, conditions, restrictions or limits on FDI inflows. They can for example
apply caps on foreign ownership as a general rule or only in particular sectors of their
economy. SORNARAJAH stresses the evidence that “the power of exclusion implies the power
to admit conditionally.”44 Also, apart from a particular exception discussed infra, States can
freely decide whether their system should discriminate foreign investors compared to their
local counterparts, or whether foreign investors from certain countries should be treated
differently than those of others. At their discretion, they can decide to offer foreign investors
more favorable treatment than local investors by offering them tax incentives in order to
attract them, for example.

The importance of international customary law in the context of foreign investment is
extremely limited. Only in very few instances does it interfere in the discretionary exercise of
a State’s sovereignty with respect to the treatment of foreign investors. As a matter of fact, the
only restriction from that perspective is that foreign investors may not be discriminated
against on racial grounds. Such discrimination would constitute a violation of international
law and more precisely of international customary law of ius cogens. It is the International

44

SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1999, 85.
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Court of Justice (ICJ) who qualified this prohibition as being of ius cogens.45 Nevertheless,
such discrimination is only unlawful under customary international law when the
discrimination is arbitrary and unjustified; e.g., acts pursuing the protection of a culture would
not be considered as unlawful discrimination on the basis of race.46

A second area in which international customary law is considered to have a potential
role is the regime of expropriation involving foreign investment. In general, property aspects
have been one of the first FDI issues with which international law became involved. Some
authors contend that a principle of international customary law would exist by virtue of which
nationalization and expropriation of foreign investment property should necessarily be
accompanied by compensation. However, even if this position would be correct, there would
in any event not yet be established an opinion juris necessitates on the determinants and
extent of such compensation.47

Countries can assume international obligations on FDI issues by entering in binding
multilateral or bilateral investment treaties. Multilateral treaties related to foreign investment
are generally likely to be negotiated in the context of IGO’s. In 1995, negotiations started
within the OECD structure with the final objective to establish a Multilateral Agreement on
45

The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law defines jus cogens as norms that “ are recognized by the
international community of states as peremptory, permitting no derogation”. See: Case concerning the
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Second Phase), Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports
1970; see for more information: BEVERIDGE, Fiona, The Treatment and Taxation of Foreign Investment under
International Law, Towards International Disciplines, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000; RUBINS,
Noah and KINSELLA, Stephan, International Investment, Political Risk and Dispute Resolution, A Practitioner’s
Guide, Oceana Publications, New York, 2005. For an application by the U.S. Courts of the concept of jus cogens
see for example: Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, C.A.9, May 22, 1992. See also:
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 289, S.D.N.Y, March 19, 2003, stating:
“States may exercice universal jurisdiction over acts committed in violation of jus cogens norms. This universal
jurisdiction extends not merely to criminal liability but may also extend to civil liability. In addition to triggering
the potentially universal exercise of jurisdiction, jus cogens violations may entail not only state but individual
liability”. The case related in part to an expropriation issue.
46
BEVERIDGE, Fiona, The Treatment and Taxation of Foreign Investment under International Law, Towards
International Disciplines, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000, 11.
47
SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1999, 74.
37

Investment, generally known as the MAI. This was the first large-scale attempt to establish a
multilateral agreement on investment liberalization and protection of foreign investors and
their investments. Although several years were spent on this project, successive drafts were
adopted and the optimism was such that non-OECD States were involved in the negotiations
with the perspective that the MAI would also reach them, it became clear by 1999 that it
would not be possible to reach a final agreements. Consequently, after all those years and the
many unsuccessful attempts to reach agreement, the negotiations ended French government’s
announcement48 of their withdrawal from the MAI-negotiations. The negotiations were never
taken up again, at least not in the context of the OECD structure. However, presently, serious
attempts are being pursued by the same developed States, to initiate a WTO round of
negotiations focused on investment liberalization. This WTO issue will be more detailed infra
in the context of the discussion of the activities and potential future activities of that IGO in
the field of international investment.

Bilateral investment treaties (BIT’s) are another source of international investment law
and consequently another international determinant of national FDI systems. A substantial
proliferation of such instruments has been observed over the last years. The two main roles of
BIT’s are the promotion of investment liberalization in general, and the protection of foreign
investors and their investments in more particular. From that perspective, the provisions of
BIT’s are generally similar to the national provisions of relatively hospitable FDI regimes.49
BIT’s moreover generally contain international dispute settlement provisions.

BIT’s exercise a considerable impact on the pattern and volume of FDI. The extent of
this impact varies in function of the number and contents of BIT’s entered into by a specific
48
49

Announcement of the French Government of 14 October 1999.
AUGUST, Ray, International Business Law, Pearson, New Jersey, 2004, 244.
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country. The nationals of a source country benefit from the existence of a BIT concluded with
a particular country. Consequently, such a treaty, and of course its specific contents, impacts
their decisions whether to invest and to what extent.

Generally, developed countries already have a far-reaching liberal investment system
with a minimum of restrictions, in which foreign direct investors and their investments benefit
not only from extensive protection but usually also from national treatment. This explains in
part why presently most BIT’s are concluded between the ‘North’ and the ‘South;’ i.e.,
between industrialized countries and developing or emerging countries. Also as a result of
that fact, and in combination with the often hypothetical character of FDI flows from
developing to developed countries, BIT’s can be said to be pursuing essentially two goals: the
liberalization or further liberalization of the FDI climate of developing countries to the benefit
of the nationals of the developed Contracting State, and attracting productive FDI to the
developing Contracting State by offering more extensive protection and less FDI restrictions.

The contents and extent of protection offered to foreign investors and their
investments varies from one BIT to another. However, most BIT’s contain clauses specifying
the treatment to which the foreign investors of the other State is entitled (fair and equitable
treatment, national treatment, and/or most-favoured-nation treatment), clauses regulating
expropriation of their assets, and dispute settlement clauses for disputes which may arise
between the host State and the foreign investor (and which often provide for international
arbitration of such dispute).

A BIT often also contains provisions specifying the entry

conditions as well as provisions that authorize the repatriation of profits and investment
capital.

In short, BIT’s render a host country’s foreign investment regime more stable,

reliable and attractive for the nationals of the Contracting State’s investors.
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International structures in general and especially IGO’s active in the field of FDI have
substantial impact on the national systems in a variety of ways, depending on the specific
nature, objectives and competences of each entity. It is undisputable that the legal and
regulatory evolutions towards more liberal FDI climates which occurred during the last
decades in many countries are in part due to IGO’s such as the IMF, the OECD, the WB and
the WTO. A wide variety of activities in the field of foreign investment can be pursued in
these structures, such as: being the forum in which negotiations on FDI take place; adopting
recommendations, guidelines or other instruments; maintaining statistical information;
promoting development through investment liberalization; researching on the impact of FDI
on development; establishing working groups or conferences to focus on specific FDI issues;
and many other activities.

The relevance and influence of the World Bank Group (WB)50 in the field of FDI can
be demonstrated by its 1992 Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment,51
although the provisions are not legally binding in se. The objective of these guidelines is to
promote further development of FDI favorable climates. The guidelines promote standards
such as the fair and equitable treatment of foreign investors (as a minimum standard of
treatment); national treatment of foreign investors in regard of the protection and security of
their person, property rights and interests; non-discrimination among foreign investors on
ground of nationality (except in the context of customs unions or free trade area agreements),
the prevention of corruption, the promotion of transparency of governmental activities in the
relation with foreign investors, and national treatment and appropriate compensation in case
of expropriation for public purposes.
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Which is a specialized agency of the United Nations.
WORLD BANK, Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, Development Committee,
September 1992.
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A relationship has to be stressed between the WB 1993 guidelines and international
customary law as a ‘brake’ on the discretionary exercise of a state’s sovereignty in the context
of the treatment of foreign investors. It has indeed been argued by certain authors that some of
the provisions of those guidelines can be considered as rules of international customary law.
This debate mainly focuses on the guideline containing the minimum standard of fair and
equitable treatment for foreign investors. Fair and equitable treatment for foreign investors
can be defined as including “the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or
administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process
embodied in the principal legal systems in the world.”52 Nevertheless, those authors are
presently still a minority in their claim that international customary law would impose such an
obligation on States.53 However, SHIHATA highlights the importance of the guidelines and
their possible contribution to such binding international law in a future: “the guidelines do not
necessarily represent universal international law … Nevertheless the can … play an
important role in a number of inter-related fields. They provide useful source material to the
drafters of future legislation, regulations, and bilateral treaties … They can also be referred
to by national courts and international arbitrators in adjudicating future investment disputes.
… The guidelines certainly have a greater value as a source of international law than the
writings of individual publicist whose divergence of views in this field is well-known. Through
their possible influence on future national legislation, bilateral treaties, judicial decisions,
and arbitral awards as well as their potential impact on the day to day behavior of states
towards foreign investors, the Guidelines could influence the evolution of customary
international law in this area. They should also facilitate any future attempt to draft and
reach agreement on a multilateral convention on the treatment of foreign investment, should
such attempt be pursued in the future. For these reasons, the lack of preparing these
52
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guidelines and bringing them to the level of acceptance they have received to date may not
indeed have been in vain.”54 This perspective can also be referred to considerations 6 and 7 of
the WB Guidelines themselves: “Recognizing that these guidelines are not ultimate standards
but an important step in the evolution of generally acceptable international standards which
complement, but do not substitute for, bilateral investment treaties; therefore calls the
attention of Member countries to the following Guidelines as useful parameters in the
admission and treatment of private foreign investment in their territories, without prejudice to
the binding rules of international law at this stage of its development”.

Other major outcomes of the activities of the WB in the field of FDI are the 1966
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes55 and the creation of the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the process of the Convention
establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Furthermore, the
activities of the WB in the field of FDI have led to many other instruments and results, such as
the establishment in 1985 of the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS),56 which advises
the governments of developing countries on the ways by which productive FDI can be
attracted.

According to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, the goal of the
establishment of the ICSID is to facilitate the settlement of investment disputes between
governments and foreign investors and consequently promote foreign investment. The ICSID
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provides the framework for conciliation and arbitration.57 Although the ICSID arbitration is
voluntary, by virtue of article 25.1 of the Convention, once consent is given to submit the
dispute for arbitration to the centre it cannot be withdrawn unilaterally. Moreover, under
articles 53 and 54, the award rendered by ICSID is binding, and must be recognized and
enforced by each Contracting State.

The main objective of the MIGA Agreement58 and the Agency established by this
instrument, the MIGA,59 is to encourage and promote the flow of investments among the
member countries in general and particularly of productive FDI in developing countries in
order to contribute to their economic growth and to the improvement of the living conditions
and well-being of their populations. In order to reach these goals the Agency issues
guarantees against non-commercial risks and carries out other activities in order to promote
FDI to and among developing member countries.60 Also in 1995 the Investment Promotion
Network (IPANET), 61 was established as part of the MIGA with the mandate to enhance FDI
in developing regions by rendering FDI resources, including national laws, treaties, research
papers and similar instruments, easily available.

The significance of the impact on national systems of the activities of the OECD and
the IMF in the field of FDI was already demonstrated in the former chapter by the trend
towards conceptual uniformity which they tend to promote.62 It has been observed that many
countries effectively established, adapted or inspired their FDI legislation on the conceptual
guidance and other guidelines contained in the Balance of Payments Manual of the IMF and
57
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See the definitional and conceptual analysis of FDI pursued in the former chapter.
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the Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment of the OECD. The
supranational EU-framework was influenced and affected by their guidelines.

Apart from promoting more uniformity in the legal definitions applied in national
systems, the OECD, which is an international organization of the most industrialized
countries,63 adopts declarations, recommendations and other instruments on a wide variety of
other FDI issues. The organization has, for example, extensive activities in the context of
BIT’s, and its influence from that perspective is illustrated by the fact that the formulations of
the principles of national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment were taken over by
the 2004 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty.64 This model treaty was also
influenced by the work of the WB: it integrated in its provisions the concept and principle of
fair and equitable treatment of foreign investors as a minimum standard, referred to by the WB
Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment.65 All the instruments of the OECD
are clearly geared towards investment liberalization, and this was illustrated in its first Code
for the Liberalization of Capital Movements adopted in 1963 and its Declaration on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises of 1976.66 Furthermore, the OECD
has been the framework in which the aforementioned long and extensive though unsuccessful
negotiations took place with the perspective of reaching a Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI). These negotiations were the most notorious efforts to reach such an
agreement.
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The establishment in 1947 of the predecessor of the WTO, the structure of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was a milestone in the history of trade liberalization.
This structure continuously evolved until it was replaced in 1995 by the WTO.67 The latter
was created by the Marrakech Final Act of 15 April 1994 and formally established on 1
January 1995. The WTO is arguably one of the most influential IGO’s in this field as well as
one of the most prominent protagonists of further economic liberalization. As a result of the
close relationship and interaction between international trade and investment, the GATT-WTO
structure, although focusing on trade liberalization (especially in the GATT era),
unquestionably had a large impact on national FDI regimes. Indeed, not only international
instruments directly regarding international investment but also the role of this structure on
foreign investment increased over the years.

In that regard, the GATT as well as two

agreements resulting from the conclusion in 1994 of the Uruguay Round negotiations, which
were conducted from 1986 till 1994 between 117 participating countries, the Trade-Related
Investment Measures Agreement (TRIMs) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATTS), are particularly representative from that perspective.

The fact that the provisions of the GATT impact at least peripherally the treatment of
foreign investment is clearly demonstrated by a dispute between the United States and Canada
over the latter’s Foreign Investment Review Act of December 1973.

A GATT dispute

settlement panel examined the complaint of the United States regarding certain types of
requirements that conditioned the approval of foreign investment projects, such as certain
local content requirements68 and export performance requirements.69 The former type of
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The GATT-agreement itself continues to exist in the larger framework of the WTO-structure. The WTO
currently has over 150 members.
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I.e. requirement that the direct investment entity buys part (or all) of its resources from local entities.
69
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exported from the host country.
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requirements were ruled inconsistent with article III.4 of GATT;
provision,71 the latter consistent.72

70

i.e., its national treatment

The Canadian investment provisions were declared

inconsistent with GATT for and only to the extent that they constituted trade-distorting
measures.

The Panel highlighted the following: “in view of the fact that the General

Agreement does not prevent Canada from exercising its sovereign right to regulate foreign
direct investments, the Panel examined the purchase and export undertakings by investors
subject to the Foreign Investment Review Act of Canada solely in the light of Canada’s trade
obligations under the General Agreement.” 73

The TRIMs was negotiated and adopted with the purpose of avoiding restrictions and
distortions of international trade that result from national investment measures.

The

agreement thus in se aims the further liberalization of international trade and does not in se
intents to interfere with national FDI regulations. Indirectly however, the agreement impacts
and promotes FDI by prohibiting several investment measures which are restrictive of
international trade. Consideration second of TRIMs itself clearly states that the goal is to
“promote the expansion and progressive liberalization of world trade and to facilitate
investment across national frontiers so as to increase the economic growth of all trading
partners.”
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Article III.4. GATT states: “the products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
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GATTS is an agreement which in se aims at the progressive liberalization of trade in
services, but contains nevertheless provisions which address foreign investment as one of the
forms of trade in services taken into consideration and defined. Article 1.2. of the Agreement
indeed defines trade in services as follows: “the supply of a service: a) from the territory of
one Member into the territory of any other Member; b) in the territory of one Member to the
service consumer of any other Member; c) by a service supplier of one Member, through
commercial presence in the territory of any other Member; d) by a service supplier of one
Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other
Member”.

Articles 16 and 17 of the GATTS Agreement, under Part III, bear the respective titles
Market Access and National Treatment. These provisions are not general obligations but
depend on the decision of a country to define and undertake such commitments by adopting a
national market-access provision containing the terms, limitations and conditions. A Member
State can commit, by virtue of article 16, to accord to services and service suppliers, or to
certain services and service suppliers, a treatment no less favourable than that defined in a
national schedule.

Article 16.2.f. is of particular interest because it relates to national

provisions restricting foreign ownership: “In sectors where market-access commitments are
undertaken, the measures which a Member shall not maintain or adopt either on the basis of
a regional subdivision or on the basis of its entire territory, unless otherwise specified in its
Schedule, are defined as: …f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of
maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or
aggregate foreign investment”. The goal pursued by this provision is to progressively
eliminate this kind of investment measure.74 According to article 17, countries can commit to
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give national treatment to foreign service suppliers, including those who can be qualified as
foreign direct investors. If a country decides to do so it will define the terms, limitations and
conditions under which the foreign entities will be treated as domestic service providers.75

The undisputable impact of the aforementioned international trade instruments
explains why the WTO decided in 1996, at the occasion of the Singapore Ministerial
Conference, to establish a Working Group on the relation between trade and investment.76
This Working Group extensively researched that particular issue as well as a wide variety of
investment-related topics.77

Since the 2001 Doha Conference, several developed countries intensified their efforts
to render the WTO the framework of multilateral negotiations on the liberalization of foreign
investment, with the expectation that such negotiations would lead to a liberal and binding
multilateral WTO-FDI agreement. This effort can be viewed as the successor of the
unsuccessful attempts of the 1990’s to reach a multilateral investment treaty in the context of
negotiations organized under the auspices of the OECD. The failure of the latter negotiations
nevertheless demonstrate the difficulties to reach agreement on the standards of treatment of
foreign investment and foreign investors and it speaks for itself that reaching such an
agreement governing foreign investment in the context of the WTO structure, i.e., involving a
substantially larger number of countries, is arguably a far more complicated challenge.
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The industrialized protagonists of a WTO agreement protecting foreign investors and
their investments and liberalizing international investment by reducing the ability of host
countries to regulate FDI, seem to be backed by the WB. Indeed, in its World Development
Report 2005, this IGO promotes investment liberalization and highlights above all the
potential benefits of a world wide liberal investment climate. Nevertheless, certain authors
stress that the WB does not balance the general benefits of international investment flows and
the specific development needs and potential adverse FDI consequences for developing
countries.78 Especially the developing countries, backed by many international nongovernmental organizations as well as many authors, insist on the importance, if not the strict
necessity, of regulatory mechanisms to ensure that FDI is beneficial for the host country.
From that perspective, SEID proposes a compromise between the interests and positions of the
major stakeholders involved (basically developed countries versus developing countries): a
hybrid model which he calls ‘Regulated Openness.’ 79
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Only the future will tell whether the developing countries will or not be able to
‘impose’ on the developing and emerging countries a WTO agreement imposing liberal
foreign investment regimes. It is clear that such a binding instrument would be an
unprecedented milestone of foreign investment and potentially fundamentally impact national
FDI regimes.

In the context of the framework of the United Nations (UN), and apart from the IMF
and the WB which are so-called specialized agencies of the UN, reference can also been made
to the contributions and impact, in the field of FDI, of the UNCTAD and the UN Statistics
Division.80 In the context of the UN itself a UN Code for Transnational Corporations was
developed and negotiated since 1972 but it failed to get adopted and was finally abandoned in
1993. The UN Statistics Division keeps statistical information on FDI in general, by category
of FDI, and by country. The UN Statistics Division mainly uses and refers to the definitions of
the IMF and the WB. The UNCTAD, which was created in 1964 as a UN Agency with the
mission to promote the economic integration of the developing countries in the world
economy,81 also compiles detailed statistical information on FDI and created an on-line World
Investment Directory, with information per country.82 Moreover, the latter organization is the
framework in which many studies on specific FDI issues are carried on,83 such as research
papers on the prospects for FDI flows per region and per country in the upcoming years.
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2.2.

International Regional Level

2.2.1. European Integration

On the international organizational level, the second part of the 20th century has been
characterized by an increasing number of free trade areas.84 The EU is undoubtedly the most
advanced and sophisticated regional organization, and this explains why the impact of EU-law
on the FDI climate of the Member States is uniquely far-reaching. The EU is characterized by
the abolition between the Member States of obstacles to the free movement of the factors of
production85: free movement of goods (title I of the EC Treaty) and free movement of
persons, services and capital (title III). Title III of the EC Treaty is subdivided in four
chapters86: workers (chapter I), right of establishment (chapter II), services (chapter III) and
capital and payments (chapter IV). The latter chapter, i.e., its articles 56 to 60, constitute the
nucleus of the principle of free movement of capital.

The free movement between Member States of the factors of production in general
have a fundamental impact on FDI. Article 56 contains the key principle with regard to the
movement of capital. The first paragraph of the article prohibits all restrictions on the
movement of capital, the second all restrictions on payments, between Member States as well
as between Member States and third countries.87 Consequently, it is fundamental to highlight
that primarily EU-law thus also impacts capital movement to and from third countries. This
84
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States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited”.
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obligation to also liberalize capital movements to and from third countries constitutes the
main difference as compared to the original provisions of the Council’s Directive 88/361 for
the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, adopted on 8 July 1988. The general principle
of free movement of capital is nevertheless mitigated by articles 57 to 60 which allow certain
restrictions or derogations in particular circumstances or on specific grounds.

Articles 57 and 58 contain the circumstances or grounds on the basis of which
Member States can restrict the general principle of free capital and payments movement.
Article 57 relates to the movement of capital between a Member State and a third country.
The article prohibits in its first paragraph the establishment of new restrictions on three types
of capital movements: direct investment operations, provision of financial services and
admission of securities to capital markets. Nevertheless, the article allows the maintenance of
restrictions on such capital movement which already existed before 1994.88 However, this
possibility for the Member States on its turn is mitigated by paragraph second of article 57 by
virtue of which community measures may be adopted on and in the context of the former
types of capital movements.89 This means that measures can be taken at the Community level
that eliminate the maintenance of national restrictions to the movement of capital which
existed before 1994.

Nevertheless, according to paragraph 2 of article 57, community

measures may be adopted even if they constitute “a step back in Community law as regards
the liberalization of the movement of capital to or from third countries.”
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Article 57.1. of the EC Treaty: “The provisions of Article 56 shall be without prejudice to the application to
third countries of any restrictions which exist on 31 December 1993 under national or Community law adopted
in respect of the movement of capital to or from third countries involving direct investment –including in real
estate- establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital markets”.
89
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adopt measures on the movement of capital to or from third countries involving direct investment –including
investment in real estate- establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to
capital markets. Unanimity shall be required for measures under this paragraph which constitute a step back in
Community law as regards the liberalization of the movement of capital to or from third countries”.
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It is to be stressed that the Community has to comply with the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality in areas which are not of its exclusive competence. Those
principles are contained in articles 2 and 5 of the EC Treaty. Acting in conformity with these
principles means that the institutions can only intervene with legal instruments when the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States separately and
furthermore can be achieved more efficiently at community level.

The provision contained in article 58 allows Member States to maintain or establish
restrictions to the general principle of free movement of capital on other grounds than the preexistence of the restriction in the concerned national framework prior to 1994.90

The

restrictions indicated in this provision can be categorized in the following types of barrierconstitutive measures or rules: the distinction in tax treatment by national law between
taxpayers on the basis to their place of residence or the place were their capital is invested;91
measures to prevent infringements of national legislation or regulations (especially measures
to prevent tax infringements and in the context of the prudential supervision of financial
institutions); measures establishing procedures for the declaration of capital movements for
administrative or statistical purposes; measures necessarily to safeguard public policy or
public security,92 and justified on these grounds; and finally, restrictions in relation with the
90

Article 58: “1. The provisions of Article 56 shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States: a) to
apply the relevant provisions of their tax law which distinguish between taxpayers who are not in the same
situation with regard to their place of residence or with regard to the place where their capital is invested; b) to
take all requisite measures to prevent infringements of national law and regulations, in particular in the field of
taxation and the prudential supervision of financial institutions, or to lay down procedures for the declaration of
capital movements for purposes of administrative or statistical information, or to take measures which are
justified on the ground of public policy or public security”.
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national security. This review procedure, established as the result of the enactment by Congress in 1988 of the
so-called Exon-Florio amendment to title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950, will be analyzed in more
detailed in the next Chapter.
53

right of establishment which are compatible with European primary law.93 Such measures
restrictive of the free movement of capital are nevertheless only valid and compatible with
EU-law on the condition and to the extent that the grounds evoked to justify them are not just
a disguise of other underlying objectives which are not considered by primary law as justified
restrictions to the free movement of capital: “the measures and procedures referred to in
paragraphs one and two shall not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or disguised
restriction on the free movement of capital and payments as defined in article 56.”94

A thorough understanding of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities (CJEC) in the context of the articles of the EC Treaty related to the free
movement of capital is essential. The impact of this important European institution results
from the fact that de facto it is not only an interpreter of law but also a ‘maker of law’.
Amongst the several important decisions rendered by the CJEC that directly impact foreign
investment in Member States is Case C-54/99 Eglise de Scientology v. France of 14 March
2000, which stresses the importance of the principle of legal certitude in the field of
restrictions to the principle of free movement of capital. In this case, the Court concluded that
article 58 of the EC Treaty prohibits systems of prior authorization for foreign direct
investments which are based on public policy and public security grounds if such systems
confine themselves to defining in general terms the investments on which such requirement
applies. The reason for this conclusion is that otherwise persons concerned by such
circumstances are not able to ascertain whether or not prior authorization is required.

Other relevant case-law regarding potentially unauthorized barriers to investment in
Members States relates to the issue of the so-called ‘golden shares’ in the context of the
93

Article 58.2.: "The provisions of this chapter shall be without prejudice to the applicability of restrictions on
the right of establishment which are compatible with this Treaty”.
94
Article 58.3.
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privatization of undertakings. Golden shares are “shares owned by a government in sufficient
number or with sufficient voting power to discourage a hostile bidder.”95 The general context
of this issue is the provisions concerning the restrictions to the free movement of capital
resulting from national rules prohibiting, restricting or dissuading inflows of foreign
investment with regard to certain specific companies or sectors. Consequently the CJEC’s
case-law regarding golden shares is applicable for the interpretation and understanding of
articles 56-60 of the EC Treaty. Together with other relevant case-law, it interprets and fills in
the gaps96 of the primary and supranational EU-law. The ‘golden shares’ cases, which build
further on and detail the Eglise de Scientology case-law, were all brought before the CJEC by
the European Commission, against respectively Italy Portugal, France, Belgium, Spain and
the United Kingdom. In the cases against Italy97 the national provisions in issue were ruled
unlawful for not being justified on the basis of article 58.1.b. of the EC Treaty, i.e., by general
interest grounds, or at least not in conformity with the principle of proportionality. In the case
involving Portugal,98 the CJEC ruled that the national provisions at issue could simply not be
95
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In the Case C-58/99 Commission v. Italy of 23 may 1999, the European Commission challenged an Italian law
(and its decrees) related to the privatization process of three formerly public companies, and more precisely the
provisions attributing special powers to the Treasury Ministry. Those special powers included the right to grant
approvals and to veto certain decisions. The Court ruled that such special powers hinder, or at least render less
attractive, the exercise of the principle of free movement of capital, while these measures could not be being
justified on the basis of article 58.1.b. i.e by general interest grounds (at least not in a way which is in conformity
with the principle of proportionality). Consequently the Italian provisions were declared unlawful.
98
In the Case C-367/98 Commission v. Portugal of 4 June 2002, the Court decided that the adoption and the
maintaining in force of the Portuguese framework privatizations law as well as of the decrees on the privatization
of undertakings adopted by virtue of that law, constitute unlawful measures under article 56 of the EC Treaty.
The unlawfulness results especially from article 13.3 of the framework privatizations law and the decrees that
provide in maximum authorized foreign participations (varying between 5 and 40 %) in undertakings of the
banking, insurance, energy and transport sectors, and the provisions requiring prior authorization of the Minister
for Financial Affairs for the acquisition of shares representing more than a certain threshold of the voting capital
or exceeding the fixed limit. In this case the Court first analyzed in the light of article 56 of the EC Treaty
(containing the general principle that all restrictions on the free movement of capital between Member States
and between Member States and Third Countries are prohibited) whether or not the Portuguese provisions
constitute restrictions on the movement of capital. It answered this question affirmatively by ruling firstly that
the prohibitions for foreign investors to acquire more than a determined percentage of shares in Portuguese
undertakings in specific sectors do not comply with article 56 of the EC Treaty. Also, the Court declared not
permissible the provisions requiring prior ministerial authorization for the acquisition of shares in excess of
certain levels, even though such authorization is also required from Portuguese nationals (the Portuguese
government indeed tried to argue that because the prior authorization requirement also applied to Portuguese
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justified on the basis of article 58.1.b., without even having to analyze whether the provisions
complied with the principle of proportionality. In the case against France,99 the national

nationals this requirement could not be considered discriminatory nor restrictive towards nationals of other
Member States). The Court indeed considered that deciding otherwise would render the principle of free
movement of capital “illusory” (see also: C-163/94, C-165/94 , C-250/94 and C-302/97), amongst other reasons
because it has a dissuasive effect on investors that are not Portuguese. The Court Stated: “article [56] of the
Treaty lays down a general prohibition on restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States. That
prohibition goes beyond the mere elimination of unequal treatment, on grounds of nationality, as between
operators on the financial markets”. Having reached this conclusion that the provisions constitute restrictions
prohibited by article 56 of the EC Treaty, the Court proceeded by analyzing whether or not these Portuguese
rules fall under the application of the articles that allow certain restrictions on the basis of the specific justifying
grounds. The Court, although stressing that in certain circumstances it can be considered justified that a Member
State keeps a certain degree of influence in a previously public undertaking when the latter’s activities concern
the provision of services in the public interest or strategic services, considered the obstacles resulting from the
privileges attached to Portugal’s position as shareholder in the privatized undertakings, not justified. In other
words, the Portuguese rules could not be considered permissible under the general interest justification nor under
the strategic reasons justification. Moreover, restrictions that are plausible to be lawful restrictions under the EC
provisions are only permissible as far as they are proportionate to the objective pursued i.e., in the worlds of the
Court, “in order to be so justified, the national legislation must be suitable for securing the objective which it
pursues and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it, so as to accord with the principle of
proportionality. ... inasmuch as the same objective could not be attained by less restrictive measures, in
particular a system of declarations ex post facto” (see also: Case C-54/99 Eglise de Scientology v. France,
2000).
99
The case against the Republic of France, case-482/99 French Republic v. Commission of 16 May 2002,
involved a French decree by virtue of which a golden share was vested in France in the Société Nationale ElfAquitaine. By virtue of that golden share, the French Minister for Economic Affairs had to approve any direct or
indirect shareholding which exceeds specific thresholds of the capital or voting rights and had moreover the right
to oppose to the transfer of specific assets (or their use as security). The Court proceeded in the same way as it
did in the case involving the Portuguese Republic. After analysis of the issue the Court concluded that the French
provisions constitute a serious impairment of the important principle of free movement of capital, and rejected
the argument of the French government that the same rules apply to French nationals, on the same grounds as it
did in the case involving Portugal. Then the Court analyzed the justifications evoked by France in order to justify
the restrictions in the light of articles 57 and following, and concluded that the objective of guaranteeing the
supply of petroleum products in the event of a crisis does constitute a legitimate general interest in the sense of
article 58.1.b. of the EC Treaty: “in the present case, the objective pursued by the legislation at issue, namely the
safeguarding of supplies of petroleum products in the event of a crisis, falls undeniably within the ambit of a
legitimate public interest. Indeed, the Court has previously recognized that the public-security considerations
which may justify an obstacle to the free movement of goods include the objective of ensuring a minimum supply
of petroleum products at all times”. Nevertheless, the French provisions at issue where considered by the Court
as a serious impairment of the EC Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital because they do not comply
with the principle of proportionality i.e. because they go beyond what is necessarily to pursue the legitimate
objectives of general interest. This decision is based on the well established case-law of the Court in Case C54/99 Eglise de Scientology v. France of 14 March 2000, and consequently the Court concluded: “The
requirements of public security, as a derogation from the fundamental principle of free movement of capital,
must be interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without
any control by the Community institutions. Thus, public security may be relied on only if there is a genuine and
sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society. ... [Furthermore] it is necessary to ascertain ...
whether the obstacles resulting from the legislation in issue ... go beyond what is necessary for that purpose. ...
The investors concerned are given no indication whatever as to the specific, objective circumstances in which
prior authorization will be granted or refused. Such lack of precision does not enable individuals to be apprised
of the extent of their rights and obligations deriving from article [58] of the Treaty. That being so, such a system
must be regarded as contrary to the principle of legal certainty. Such a wide discretionary power constitutes a
serious interferences with the free movement of capital, and may have the effect of excluding it altogether.
Consequently, the system in issue clearly goes beyond what is necessary in order to attain the objective pleaded
by the French Government, namely the prevention of any disruption of a minimum supply of petroleum products
in the event of a real threat”. In short, both the mechanism of prior authorization as the right to oppose the
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provision in issue was considered pursuing a lawful objective in the sense of article 58.1.b.
but nevertheless an impairment of the principle of proportionality. Belgium’s legislation was
considered justified on public interest grounds and moreover ruled in conformity with the
principle of proportionality.100

Presently the analyzed case-law of the Court is clearly

established as a result from the numerous references to those cases in the most recent cases,
especially the one involving Spain and one United Kingdom in the same context of formerly
public companies that had been privatized.101

This case-law clearly demonstrates the

importance of the principle of proportionality and of legal certainty in the interpretation of the
principle of free movement of capital as well as of the lawfulness of the restrictions to it on
the basis of articles 57 and 58 of the EC Treaty.
transfer or use as security of certain specific assets, are not proportionate with the nevertheless legitimate
objective of public interest pursued by the French legislation in issue.
100
To better conceptualize and understand what is considered as proportional to the legitimate objectives
pursued and what is not, it is interesting to compare the analyzed cases with case C-503/99, Commission v.
Belgium of 4 June 2002. As in the French case, a legal provision attributed to the Belgian State a ‘golden share’
in two formerly public companies, the Société nationale de transport par canalisations SA and the Société de
distribution du gaz SA, and by virtue of which it had the right to advance notice of transfers of shares (or use of
them as a security) combined with the right to oppose to such transaction if it is considered that this would
adversely affect the national interests in the energy field. It has to be highlighted that contrary to the French
provisions, the Belgian provisions thus did not instituted a system of prior authorisation but one of prior
declaration i.e. a mere notification of the transaction to the competent authorities. The Court concluded first that
the continuity of supplies of natural gas is an issue of public interest in the light of article 58.1.b. and is therefore
lawful if the measures in issue are to be considered necessary and proportionate to this objective. On the latter
issue the Court decided that the Commission did not prove that less restrictive measures could have been taken
in order to achieve the legitimate objective under article 58.1.b., and stressed moreover that the allegedly less
restrictive measures evoked by the Commission would on the contrary constitute a heavier barrier to the free
movement of capital than the challenged measures.
101
In Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, of 13 may 2003, the Court decided that a Spanish law and its
implementing royal decrees establishing a system of prior administrative approval relating to transactions of
shares of certain privatised undertakings constituted an impairment of the principle of free movement of capital,
and came to that conclusion after a substantial analysis in which is referred, at several occasions, to the Belgian,
French and Portuguese cases referred to supra. Consequently, the Court recognized the lawfulness of derogations
to article 56 of the EC Treaty on grounds of general public interest or strategic imperatives, but observed that
corporations such as Tabacelara SA, which produces tobacco, and Corporación Bancaria de España SA, which
has no functions of a central bank nor similar functions, are not entities for which the justification of public
interest (the need to ensure continuity in public services) can apply. Furthermore, concerning the remaining three
privatized corporations in issue (a petroleum, a telecommunications and an electricity company), the Court
decided that although these are active in sectors which can be considered as public services sectors whose
safeguarding of supply can be considered of public interest in the sense of article 58.1.b of the EC Treaty, the
challenged measures establishing the requirement of prior administrative approval for share transactions in those
companies, are unlawful because they do not lay down objective and stable criteria which are public (impairment
of the principle of legal certainty) and consequently (conform the established case-law) for not complying with
the principle of proportionality. Finally in a case decided by the Court on 13 May 2003 (Case C-98/01,
Commission v. United Kingdom), provisions of the United Kingdom’ Airports Act which limited the possibility
of acquiring voting shares in BAA plc and established a system of prior consent before disposing of its assets,
were declared unlawful for being unjustified restrictions of the principle of free movement of capital.
57

The right of establishment, i.e., the right to establish and manage companies or selfemployed activities in another Member State, is of particular importance in the context of
FDI. Article 43.1 of the EC Treaty provides: “within the framework of the provisions set out
below, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the
territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to
restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any
Member State established in the territory of any Member State.” Article 46 specifies that “the
provisions of this chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the
applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for
special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public
health.”

The impact of the EU-law and its four freedoms is clearly not limited to interEuropean investment transactions. It also has far-reaching consequences for investors that are
nationals of third countries. Essential is article 48 of the EC Treaty provides that firms which
are formed in accordance with the legislation of the Member State and that have their
registered office, central administration or principal place of business in one of the Member
States will be considered nationals of Member States and consequently benefit of the EUsystem of free movement of factors of production. This provision constitutes an important
advantage when extra-communitarian investors are able to establish a subsidiary in one of the
Member States; indeed: “companies established within a Member State cannot be
discriminated against on the grounds of their foreign parent company; rather the nondiscrimination principle entitles them to buy and sell goods throughout the EU, recruit and
employ workers from any Member State and in any Member State and to establish
subsidiaries, branches or offices or to provide their services on a temporary basis in any
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Member State, on the same terms as other nationals of that state.”102 But the particular
provision of article 48 does not in se reduce the right of the individual Member States to apply
entry and operation conditions towards FDI from outside the EU. In any event an open liberal
investment climate reigns in the EU. However, it has been confirmed that although “all
Member States operate, to a greater or lesser degree, an ‘open door’ policy (in keeping with
the OECD Liberalization Codes), the levels of restriction still vary considerably between
Member States and from sector to sector. In relation to financial services, for instance, some
states have been particularly sensitive about access by investors from outside the EU and this
is reflected in relevant EC legislation; other examples include the UK’s sensitivity about
issues such as control of the media, while for France the cultural industries remain
sensitive.”103

The number of instruments of secondary EU-law impacting foreign investment
streams in Member States has been increasing constantly. One recent example is the EU
takeover law resulting from Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids of 21 April 2004, i.e., 14
years after it was first proposed by the European Commission. This directive is to be
transposed in the national legislations of the Member States by 20 May 2006. The objective of
the instrument is to establish common standards of takeover regulation in the different
national legislations in order to reduce the existing barriers to cross-border takeovers.
However, the instrument succeeded only very partially in that objective. The lack of success
results mainly from its configuration as a ‘minimum rules’ directive and from the fact that it is
possible for each Member State to opt out from two of the main provisions,104 more precisely
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103
BEVERIDGE, Fiona, The Treatment and Taxation of Foreign Investment under International Law, Towards
International Disciplines, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000, 126.
104
Articles 9 and 12 of the Directive. Most of the Members States already expressed their intent to make use of
this opt-out possibility.
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rules regarding the use of so-called poison pills and other takeover defenses. Another example
or recent EU activity with impacts on foreign investment is the current EU Banking Directive
2000/12/EC105 resulting from the concern that the reduced cross-border consolidation in the
financial sector might be unable in the future to compete in the growing world competition in
that sector. Further reforms are expected in order to remove the currently existing barriers for
consolidation in the European financial sector.

The European institutions actively participate in international structures in order to
promote the interests of the Member States. The EU, which is a Member of the WTO in its
own right, is for example actively backing the attempts made by the developing countries to
promote the negotiation and adoption of a binding multilateral investment treaty. In a
submission to the WTO it stated that “the current patchwork of rules is unsatisfactory and
being increasingly seen as an inefficient and non-transparent framework for making
investments and protecting investments abroad” in order to highlight the importance of “a
level playing field worldwide for FDI” and its conviction that “the WTO is in a position to be
an instrument in answering these needs.”106

A final example of this role of the EU are the successive ACP-EC agreements (the socalled Lomé and Cotonou conventions), which are a relatively broad cooperation program
between the EU countries and the ACP countries. ACP stands for African, Caribbean and
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Pacific.107 It also includes cooperation in the field of trade and in general has contributed in
rendering the investment climate of the ACP countries more open and attractive.108

107

There are 71 ACP countries. The list of the ACP countries is available on the website of the Directorate
General of the European Commission under External Trade with the ACP countries:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/index_en.htm
108
Extensive information on the cooperation between the European Union and the ACP countries is available on
the following website of the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/index_en.htm
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2.2.2. American Cooperation and Integration

In January 1994 Canada, Mexico and the United States established a free trade
Agreement, NAFTA. Contrary to the WTO framework, the NAFTA contains provisions that
specifically deal with investment.109 These provisions are contained in Part V of the
Agreement (‘Investment, Services and Related Matters’). Chapter eleven is especially
important for this issue. Further chapters contain more specific rules for particular sectors
such as telecommunications and financial services.

The investment regime generally applicable in the NAFTA territory is mainly
characterized by the principles of national treatment110 and MFN-treatment.111 Consequently,
each Member State has to accord to investors of another Member State, and to their
investments, the same treatment as it accords to its own investors or to the investors of the
other Member State with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investment. If the treatment to which an
investor of another Member State is entitled by application of the MFN provision is better
than the treatment to which he is entitled by virtue of the national treatment principle, the
former treatment will prevail.112 Furthermore, a minimum standard of treatment is provided
for in article 1105: treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security. However, by virtue of article 1106.1 the
following performance or commitment requirements may be imposed: “a) to export a given
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The Agreement adopts a general and broad definition of foreign investment and does not distinguishes FDI
and FPI. The concept of investment for the purposes of the agreement is defined in its article 1139.
110
Art. 1102 NAFTA. Art. 1102.4. emphasizes: “For greater certainty, no Party may: a) impose on an investor
of another Party a requirement that a minimum level of equity in an enterprise in the territory of the Party be
held by its nationals, other than nominal qualifying shares for directors or incorporators of corporations; or b)
require an investor of another Party, by reasons of its nationality, to sell or otherwise dispose of an investment
in the territory of the Party”.
111
Art. 1103 NAFTA.
112
Art. 1104 NAFTA.
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level or percentage of goods or services, b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic
content, c) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or services provided in
its territory, or to purchase goods or services from persons in its territory, d) to relate in any
way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of exports or to the amount of
foreign exchange inflows associated with such investment, e) to restrict sales of goods or
services in its territory that such investment produces or provides by relating such sales in
any way to the volume or value of its exports or foreign exchange earnings, f) to transfer
technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a person in its territory,
except when the requirement is imposed or the commitment or undertaking is enforced by a
court, administrative tribunal or competition authority to remedy an alleged violation of
competition laws or to act in a manner not inconsistent with other provisions of this
Agreement, or g) to act as the exclusive supplier of the goods it produces or services it
provides to a specific region or world market”.

Article 1106.3 prohibits the conditioning of the receipt of advantages related with
investment on compliance with performance or commitment requirements but contains
similar exceptions to this rule as those included in the afore mentioned article 1106.1. By
virtue of article 1107.1 it is prohibited to require from investors of another Member State that
nationals be appointed to senior management positions. Nevertheless, by virtue of article
1107.2 it is not prohibited to require that a majority of the board of directors be of a particular
nationality or a resident of the host country, except if this would result in the investor not
having the ability to exercise control over its investment.

However, to the broad general rules an important number of significant reservations
and exceptions apply. These are mainly contained in article 1180 and in the annexes to the
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NAFTA agreement. Their impact on the general regime is considerable: “the apparently broad
application of these provisions is in practice heavily restricted by the use of reservations and
exceptions.”113

The NAFTA agreement also contains various provisions related to the protection of
foreign investors and their investments. Article 1110 of NAFTA regulates nationalization and
expropriation. A Member State may only proceed to such operations on an investment of an
investor of another Member State when a series or conditions and requirements are complied
with: a) public purpose, b) non-discriminatory basis, c) due process of law, d) payment of a
just, fair and timely compensation. Articles 1110.2-6 define what should be understood by a
just, fair and timely compensation: a) equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated
investment, b) payment without delay, c) payment in a G7 currency, d) interest at a
commercially reasonable rate for the used currency from the date of expropriation until the
date of actual payment.

Regarding the establishment of investments by investors of other Member States,
article 1111 NAFTA provides that Member States maintain the right to apply formalities as
well as the right to require date from such investors. However, the entry formalities may not
de facto result in impairing the protections afforded to the investors of other Member States,
and the gathering of information from those investors may only pursue informational and
statistical purposes.

Article 1114.2 of NAFTA contains an interesting provision in order to avoid national
provisions which might promote environmental shopping and related types of shopping. It
113
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states that it is “inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or
environmental measures.” If a Member State would consider that another Member State did
encouraged a particular investment or investments in general by such investment attracting
measures, the three Member States will consult with each other in order to find a way to see
those measures removed from the concerned national regulatory framework.

The Organization of American States (OAS) is a regional IGO which was established
in 1948 by 21 American States. Today the IGO counts 35 Member States.114 The Trade
Section115 of the OAS has played an important role in the development and the negotiations in
preparation of the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).116 The decision to
establish the FTAA by 2005 was taken by the Member States of the OAS at the occasion of the
1994 Miami Summit of the Americas: “A key to prosperity is trade without barriers, … and
with an increased stream of productive investments … Free trade and increased economic
integration are key factors for raising standards of living, improving the working conditions
of people in the Americas and better protecting the environment. We, therefore, resolve to
begin immediately to construct the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), in which
barriers to trade and investment will be progressively eliminated. We further resolve to
conclude the negotiation of the FTAA no later than 2005.”117

The main goal of the FTAA is to progressively eliminate the barriers to both trade and
foreign investment between the 35 Member States. The importance of the liberalization of
114
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investment flows is stressed in the Declaration of Principles of the 1994 Miami Summit of the
Americas: “Aware that investment is the main engine for growth in the Hemisphere, we will
encourage such investment by cooperating to build more open, transparent and integrated
markets. In this regard, we are committee to create strengthened mechanisms that promote
and protect flows of productive investment in the Hemisphere, and to promote the
development and progressive integration of capital markets.” Although clear deadlines had
been agreed upon since 1995, no definitive agreement could be reached at the last FTAA
summit held in January 2005. At this Mar de Plata FTAA Summit, it was nevertheless agreed
that the countries would meet again in 2006 to resume the negotiations. Consequently, there is
currently only a draft FTAA agreement.118

With respect to regional economic integration in the American hemisphere can
furthermore be referred to MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL,119 the Comunidad Andina (CAN),120
and the Caribbean Community (CARRICOM).121 MERCOSUR was established on 26 March
1991 by the Asuncion Treaty. The main goal of MERCOSUR is to increase the economic
integration of the Member States by promoting free trade amongst them. The purported
strengthening of the economic integration, although mainly focused on trade, nevertheless
also involves measures at least indirectly related with FDI. The CAN has established a
‘common foreign investment regime’ by its Decision 291 of 22 March 1991. This instrument
guarantees equal and non discriminatory treatment to foreign investors but stresses that for the
rest, the Member States remain the determinants of their respective foreign investment
policies.
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2.2.3. Cooperation and Integration in other Geographical Areas

Apart from the structures existing in the American hemisphere and the EU, several
IGO’s and international structures of other continents are active in the field of FDI, although
often not as a main part of their activities. Special mention can be made of the following: the
Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN),122 the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC),123 the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)124 and
the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG).125

The ASEANwas established on 8 August 1967 by the

Bangkok Declaration with

strengthened economic cooperation as both an objective and a medium for the purpose of
economic growth of the Member States. The current Member States are Brunei Darussalam,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and
Vietnam.126 The economic cooperation between the Member States led to the 1992
Framework Agreement on Enhancing Economic Cooperation by virtue of which the
establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was purported. The AFTA was realized
in 2003. The current main objectives of AFTA reach further than the liberalization of trade
and include also investment cooperation and liberalization. The cooperation in the field of
investment takes place among others under the form of common measures to attract more FDI
to theASEAN .

The cooperation led to the establishment of several ASEANInvestment Promo tion
Agencies and to the signing of the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area
122
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(AIA) on 7 October 1998.127 The objective of the Agreement is to enhance ASEAN’s
attractiveness and competitiveness for promoting direct investments through a more liberal
and transparent investment environment128: “the objectives are … to establish a competitive
ASEAN Investment Area with a) more liberal and transparent investment environment
amongst Member States in order to; i) substantially increase the flow of investments into
ASEAN both ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources; ii) jointly promote ASEAN as the most
attractive investment area; iii) strengthen and increase the competitiveness of ASEAN’s
economic sectors; iv) progressively reduce or eliminate investment regulations and conditions
which may impede investment flows and the operation of investment projects in ASEAN; and
b) to ensure that the realization of the above objectives would contribute towards free flow of
investments by 2020”. In order to achieve these goals the Member States agreed on several
provisions. For example, the Member States agreed to immediately open their industries for
investors of other ASEAN countries and to accord them also the benefit of the national
treatment principle.129 Each Member State may however exclude specific sectors from access
for investors of other ASEAN Member States, as well as from the application of the principle
of national treatment. This implies nevertheless that the Member State deciding to use this
option establishes a list. Those lists are furthermore reviewed every two years with the view
of progressively phasing these exclusions out by 2010.130

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation is a framework and meeting forum currently
composed of 21 countries that border the Pacific Ocean.131 The structure predominantly
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pursues economic goals. In 1996 its activities regarding economic integration led to the
Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA) in order to liberalize or further liberalize trade and
investment between the member countries. Especially its Trade and Investment Committee
and the Investment Expert Group promote APEC
’s goals of investment liberalization by
pursuing more transparency of the national investment regimes, by organizing conferences
and publishing papers in order to facilitate investment activities,132 and by establishing non
binding instruments such as the Non-Binding Investment Principles and Options for
Investment Liberalization and Business Facilitation to Strengthen the APEC Economies.133

By Charter of 8 December 1985 Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan
and Sri Lanka134 established the SAARC in order to increase economic cooperation between
the member countries. The Charter mainly focuses on the liberalization of inter-SAARC trade
and from that perspective established the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA).135 However,
article 8.h. of the Charter focuses on foreign investment. It is stated: “Contracting States
agree to consider … the adoption of trade facilitation and other measures to support and
complement SAFTA for mutual benefit. These may include, among others: … h) removal of
barriers to intra-SAARC investments.” Nevertheless, the provision primarily aims at
facilitating intra-SAARC trade by removing trade-restraining investment measures. In the
context of this provision 8.h, the SAARC prepared a draft Regional Agreement on Promotion
and Protection of Investment within the SAARC Region. The draft, which is currently
considered by the Member States, contains provisions on the promotion and protection of
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Amongst those papers published in order to facilitate investment activities can be referred to the Guide to the
Investment Regimes of the APEC including a description of the national FDI framework of each of the Member
States (http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/committees/committee_on_trade/investment_experts.html.).
133
Adopted by APEC’s Investment Expert Group.
134
These countries represent one fifth of the world population.
135
Article 2 of the Charter.
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investments from investors from other Member States, on arbitration of disputes, and on the
avoidance of double taxation.

The CCASG was established by the Charter of 25 May 1981 between the Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. One of its main goals is to strengthen
economic cooperation between the Member States.136 The Charter views the approximation
and possibly unification of their respective regulations and laws in certain fields as an
important tool to reach this objective. In that perspective the CCASG established a Reference
Model Regulation/Law for the Promotion of Foreign Investment in the GCC States. 137
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Article 4 of the Charter of the CCASG.
Available on: http://www.gcc-sg.org/soon.html. For more information on resources, including electronic
resources, on the different regional frameworks see also the following sites and the links they contain: World
Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) (http://www.waipa.org/), Foreign Direct Investment
Promotion Center (FDIPC) (http://www.fdipromotion.com), FDI Xchange which was developed by the World
Bank Group’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency -MIGA- (http://www.fdixchange.com), and the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (http://www.iccwbo.org).
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CHAPTER III.
NATIONAL LEGAL DETERMINANTS OF FDI SYSTEMS AND THEIR LEVEL OF
OPENNESS AND ATTRACTIVENESS TOWARDS FDI INFLOWS

The present chapter proceeds with a successive analysis of the national legal
determinants of FDI systems. That such a methodology is unavoidably, to a certain extent,
artificial has already been stressed in the introduction to the present study. Nevertheless, from
a certain perspective, each of the elements examined, taken individually, can already
constitute some indication of a country’s FDI hospitality. Indeed, each of them constitutes a
definitional component of a country’s legal and regulatory system. Moreover, the analytical
decomposition of FDI systems in different determinants can render a first comparison
between national systems less complex.

However, it is clear that each determinant only takes its full meaning when viewed in
the context of the aggregate of national and international determinants. Stated otherwise, a
national FDI system is more than the sum of its determinants: it is also defined by the
interactions between them. This chapter and especially the conclusion to the present paper
will highlight this.
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The most pertinent elements to define a specific host economy’s legal investment
climate and to determine its extent of attractiveness -if attractive at all- can broadly be
regrouped into four categories of provisions: the rules that apply to the entry of FDI, those
applying to the treatment and protection of foreign investors and their investments, those
applicable to the exit of FDI, and finally a remainder category of other national legal
determinants.

On the basis of these four categories of rules, the following issues will be discussed:
the types of entry procedures that can be encountered (notification formalities or screening
and approval procedures); the exclusion of certain sectors of the host economy from FDI and
the underlying rationales for such carve-outs (national security concerns, superior national
interests, national interests in general, or mere economic protectionism); foreign ownership
restrictions; entry conditions and performance requirements such as technology transfer,
employment of locals, minimum capital, local content and export quotas; the treatment of
foreign investors in comparison with their national counterparts; legal protection and
guarantees including the issue of expropriation; financial and other incentives to attract
foreign direct investors; the applicable tax regime including the issue of double taxation
treaties; foreign exchange regulations; the regime applicable to the settlement of disputes
between foreign direct investors and the host State and reciprocity requirements.

It is less complex to extract those rules-determinants from FDI systems that are
organized in a series of investment laws and regulations138 -and even more so if the rules are
integrated in a single comprehensive investment code- than when a country’s FDI regime is
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Sometimes investment laws are called joint ventures laws, which indicates that FDI can only take the form of
a joint venture with locals (e.g. formerly the case of China; since a few years full ownership is possible in
several circumstances).
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dispersed over a broad set of sources.139 In any event, an increasing number of States opt for
more transparency of their regulatory FDI framework; consequently, the number of national
systems with a well organized and easily accessible FDI regime has been increasing over the
years.

For the purposes of the present paper, the analysis of FDI determinants is limited to
the rules governing inbound foreign investment; i.e., to the perspective of a country acting in
its quality of host economy as opposed to source or home country of foreign investors. It can,
however, briefly be highlighted that a source country’s policy and laws in general and those
governing outbound FDI in particular, strongly influence the decisions of its nationals
whether to invest abroad as well as the volume and the pattern of the investment outflows.140
FDI towards a specific host economy can, for example, be facilitated (or deterred) by the
existence (or absence) of a BITbetween both countries. Other examples of outbound FDI
determinants are the tax treatment applicable to the income generated abroad, the nature of its
foreign exchange control system, the availability of subsidies or other promotional measures
for outbound FDI, and, occasionally, a source country’s legal system even regulates FDI to
some extent extraterritorially.141

139

The complexity and extent of dispersion of FDI rules in a national system can vary greatly. In some countries
there are only a few complications such as those resulting from the coexistence of general investment
instruments and instruments specific to a particular sector(s) or sub-sector(s) of the economy. In other cases the
situation can be more complex for example because of the existence of a wide variety of laws and regulations
applicable in different sectors, in different regions of the country or specific zones, and furthermore, as a result
of the dispersion of the pertinent rules over different types of legislations.
140
For more information on the facilitation of FDI outflows by home countries policies and legislation, see:
SHIHATA, Ibrahim F.I., Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment: “The World Bank Guidelines”, Martinus
Nijhoff, London, 1993, 22.
141
E.g.: in the United States: the Foreign Corruption Practice Act, 15 USC § 78 (1977). See also: the OECD
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.
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3.1.

RULES APPLICABLE TO THE ENTRY OF FDI

The national provisions governing the entry and establishment of foreign direct
investments are essential characteristics of a host country’s investment system. As stressed
before, the application of the doctrine of state sovereignty to the issue of FDI means that a
state can decide at its discretion to exclude or restrict foreign investment and consequently
also to admit conditionally.

Although performance and commitment requirements relate to the post-entry operation
of the investment entity, they are technically spoken entry conditions; therefore, they have
been included in this first category of FDI rules.

At the occasion of the entry of FDI, the foreign investor has to opt for a particular
business structure. Although it is not the objective of the present paper to focus on this topic,
nor on the consequences, the choice of a particular business structure in a specific country can
involve, this issue will nevertheless briefly be referred to in a few occasions.

Will successively be analyzed142: the various kinds of entry procedures, where a basic
distinction will be made between notification procedures on one hand and approval and
screening procedures on the other; the issue of the existence in virtually every legal system of
a certain number of sectors which are excluded for FDI and the underlying rationales; rules
restricting foreign ownership; rules conditioning the entry and maintenance of FDI to
compliance with specific conditions, including the issue of performance requirements.
142

The subdivision of rules containing entry conditions in three groups, more precisely capitalization
requirements, carve-outs/exclusions, and ownership restrictions, proposed by SEID, although equally valid, will
not be followed (SEID, Sherif H., Global Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, Ashgate, Burlington, 2002,
36). The subdivision of the present paper nevertheless partially overlaps with SEID’s subdivision.
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3.1.1. ENTRY PROCEDURES

FDI entry procedures can be broadly divided in two categories: notification procedures
and approval procedures. The concept of an FDI notification system is used as meaning that
the foreign direct investor has the obligation to declare the investment transaction to the
administrative authority designated by the national law for those purposes. On the other hand,
in an approval and screening system, the foreign investor cannot proceed with his projected
FDI transaction before having obtained administrative approval. Apart from the entry
procedures, some national laws require foreign direct investors to report periodically to the
competent administrative entity on specific data. This can be required for the limited purpose
of gathering information and statistical data, or for other purposes.

However, there exists a wide variety of forms and practices for each of those
categories, and their results sometimes overlap (e.g., a notification procedure with possibility
for the authorities to review, suspend and prohibit retroactively). Moreover, several kinds of
entry procedures can exist within the same national system. For example, the obligation to
notify the investment can be the general rule applicable in most sectors of the host country’s
economy, while for specific sectors considered sensitive in the particular country a prior
authorization system could be imposed. That country could, moreover, have more than one
notification procedure or approval procedure. For example, there are different procedures for
the different kinds of FDI transactions or business structures involved, in function of the
specific sectors or sub-sectors or in function of the nationality of the foreign direct investors.
It can be observed that in countries where mere notification is the general rule and prior
approval a rare exception, the latter is generally inspired by national security or public interest
concerns.
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The French FDI system provides a good illustration of the aforementioned practice.
By virtue of articles L 151-2-c and R 152-5 of the Monetary and Financial Code, FDI
transactions generally are only subject to a mere administrative declaration. Article R 152-5
contains a long list of foreign direct investments, which are dispensed of this formality. Such
absence of the obligation to declare a foreign investment is clearly very FDI hospitable. As an
exception to the rule, the French FDI system submits certain FDI operations to prior
authorization or control by the Minister of Economic Affairs.143 The operations implying an
authorization procedure, enumerated in article R 153-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code,
are those that potentially could imperil national security, public health or other public order
interests. Amongst the activities listed are those related to gambling; private security;
research, development and production of ways to combat the illicit use of pathogenic or toxic
products by terrorist organizations; development of tools for interception of correspondence
or detection of distant conversations; research, development and production or distribution of
weapons, ammunition, powders and explosive substances destined for military purposes.
After analysis of the specific operation, the Minister of Economic Affairs can prohibit or
authorize under compliance with specific conditions.144 However, the power of the Minister of
Economic Affairs is not discretionary. Not only must he explicitly justify the reasons of his
decision to refuse an FDI operation, but he can only refuse to grant an authorization on the
basis of one (or both) of the following grounds, stated in article R 153-10 of the Monetary
and Financial Code: the necessity of guaranteeing national security, public health or public
order;145 and the existence of a serious presumption that the investor will possibly commit
specific listed crimes such as drug trafficking, corruption, terrorism or money laundering. The
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Articles L 151-3 an R 153-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code.
Article L 151-3, II, of the Monetary and Financial Code.
145
And when moreover it is not possible to safeguard those interests by granting an authorization accompanied
by conditions.
144
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French entry procedure in the context of the issue of national security will be referred to in
more detail in the next section.

A particular hybrid variant of entry procedure is found where national authorities have
the right to review, suspend and prohibit a notified FDI transaction. For example, this is the
case in the United States in a strictly limited number of occasions, more precisely in
circumstances where a foreign acquisition is likely to jeopardize national security. The review
procedure that is applicable to inbound mergers, acquisitions and takeovers by foreign persons
was established in 1988 by Congress’s adoption of the so-called Exon-Florio amendment to
title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950.146 The fact that the system establishing this
review procedure authorized the President of the United States to review, suspend and
prohibit foreign acquisitions of U.S. businesses only when imperilment of national security so
justifies is a direct result of the fact that the U.S. has a liberal and hospitable FDI regime. The
President delegated the authority to investigate cases based on the Exon-Florio provision to
the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS). The underlying idea of
the regulation is to balance the U.S. open investment policy -which provides substantial
economic benefits for the United States

147

- against the necessity of protecting national

security -by protecting amongst others, critical infrastructure, securing defense supply and
preserving technological superiority in the defense arena.148 In other words, the principal
purpose of the Exon-Florio provision “is to authorize the President to suspend or prohibit
146

The Exon-Florio amendment was enacted as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Bill of 1988,
and more precisely as section 5021 of that Act (Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107; 50 U.S.C.App. § 2170).
Another amendment to the Defense Production Act, the so-called Byrd amendment, was enacted in 1992.
147
For a list of the major benefits of inbound FDI for the United States see: UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, How Foreign Direct Investment Benefits the United States, Office of the Spokesman, 13 March 2006
(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/63041.htm). In short, the main benefits enumerated are the creation of
jobs, higher wages with a potential effect of boosting wages in general, beneficial effects on the manufacturing
industry, increased research and development, entry of technology and skill, increased overall productivity,
increased tax revenues, facilitation of foreign market penetration and consequential increase of the export
volume, maintenance of law interest rates.
148
United States Governmental Accountability Office (GAO). Enhancements to the Implementation of ExonFlorio Could Strengthen the Laws’ Effectiveness. Washington D.C., September 28, 2005, 05-686, 1.
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any merger, acquisition, or takeover, by or with a foreign person, of a person engaged in
interstate commerce in the United States when, in the President's view, the foreign interest
exercising control over that person might take action that threatens to impair the national
security.”149 Furthermore, the possibility to block foreign acquisitions of U.S. businesses on
the basis of the Exon-Florio provision is only available if no other federal laws are adequate
to safeguard national security,150 and at the condition that the imperilment of national security
is demonstrated by credible evidence. It is to be stressed that the power to block foreign
acquisitions includes the power to terminate already present foreign investment activity.151

Because the term, national security, is not completely clear, to a certain extent, it
causes legal incertitude for foreign investors. The statute does not contain an exact definition
of a threat to national security, but it nevertheless contains certain guidelines to be taken into
consideration in the qualification process: “domestic production needed for projected
national defense requirements; the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet
national defense requirements, including the availability of human resources, products,
technology, materials, and other supplies and services; the control of domestic industries and
commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United
States to meet the requirement of national security; the potential effects of the proposed or
pending transaction on sales of military goods, equipment, or technology to any country
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31 C.F.R. § 800.101.
Amongst the laws that may be an adequate alternative to safeguard national security can be enumerated: the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796c), the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (22 C.F.R. §§
120- 130), the Trading with the Enemy Act (12 U.S.C. § 95) and other provisions of the Defense Production Act
(50 U.S.C. App. § 2061, et seq.). For more information about the Exon-Florio amendment see: WATSON, Arthur
R., Implementation of the Exon-Florio amendment: the record after four years, Practising Law Institute,
Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, October 1-2, 1992; SABINO, Michael A. Transactions that
imperil national security, A look at the Government’s Power to Say No, New York State Bar Journal, NovemberDecember 2005; BENDANIEL, David J., ROSENBLOOM, Arthur H., and HANKS, James J. Jr., International M&A
joint ventures and Beyond, Doing the Deal, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2002, 20; LEWIS, James A., New
Objectives for CFIUS: Foreign Ownership, Critical Infrastructure, and Communications Interception, Federal
Communications Law Journal, May 2005, 457.
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SEID, Sherif H, Global Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, Ashgate, Burlington, 2002, 36.
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identified by the Secretary of State as a country that supports terrorism, as a country of
concern regarding missile proliferation or as a country of concern regarding the proliferation
of chemical and biological weapons; the potential effects of the proposed or pending
transaction on United States international technological leadership in areas affecting United
States national security.”152 The absence of a clear definition in the statute creates conflicts
between the protagonists of a broad interpretation and those who defend a narrow definition
in order to strictly restrict the exceptions to the general rule of an open U.S. investment
market.153 Amongst the partisans of a broad view of what is to be considered as a threat to
national security, it is argued that on the basis of the last factor mentioned by the statute’s
guidelines of elements to be taken into consideration -the potential effects of a transaction on
U.S. international technological leadership in areas affecting national security-, even
transactions between companies that have no relation with the defense industry can be
reviewed, suspended and prohibited for national security reasons.154 Sometimes, it is even
argued that the concept of national security in the sense of the Exon-Florio provision could
include the “safeguarding of the country’s economy and business interests.”155

In order to illustrate the practical implications entry procedures can have on foreign
investors, it is helpful to refer to a few cases resulting from the application of the abovedescribed U.S. review procedure. In 1992, the French Corporation Thomson-CSF, S.A. did not
succeed to obtain U.S. approval -and ended by withdrawing its CFIUS application- for its
asset acquisition of the missiles division of LTV Aerospace and Defense Company, Inc., a
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Defense Production Act of 1950, Sept. 8, 1950, C. 932 (64 Stat. 798; 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 2170).
For more ample information on the genesis of the Exon-Florio provision and the interpretation of the concept
of national security, see: SHEARER, Robert W., Exon-Florio Amendment: protectionist legislation susceptible to
abuse, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 1729 (1993).
154
BENDANIEL, David J., ROSENBLOOM, Arthur H., and HANKS, James J. Jr., International M&A joint ventures
and Beyond, Doing the Deal. John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2002, 38.
155
SABINO, Anthony Michael, Transactions that Imperil National Security; A Look at the Government’s Power
to Say No, NYSBA Journal, November-December 2005, 20.
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U.S. manufacturer of military and commercial aerospace and defense products.156 This was a
result of the government’s refusal on national security grounds. More recently, the CFIUS
applied the Exon-Florio rule to review a transaction between IBM and a Chinese corporation,
Lenovo Group Ltd., a $1.75 billion transaction aiming at the sale of the former’s PC business
to the latter. The Chinese company projected to reincorporate in the United States and to take
over part of IBM’s real estate. The potential imperilment of the national security that the
CFIUS wanted a review related to industrial espionage and technology transfer issues. In
March 2005, CFIUS agreed to approve the transaction, but only because of the fact that the
national security concerns were effectively addressed and overcome by modifications brought
to the acquisition transaction. These changes to the transaction aimed among other things at
avoiding Chinese espionage on computer systems within the U.S. government.157

The extent of rigor and burdensomeness of a prior approval system can vary
substantially from one national system to another. While in some systems the governmental
approval is given quasi automatically and in a short period, and consequently often a mere
formality, in others, the restraint of the approval and screening procedure is effective and
sometimes even made unduly cumbersome and complicated. In addition, within the same
national system, obtaining governmental approval can be easy in certain sectors or
circumstances but particularly burdensome in more sensitive sectors or circumstances. For
example, the rigor of the entry procedure will especially vary in function of the amounts
invested in Argentina, while it can significantly vary in function of the percentage of foreign
ownership in the Philippines. The approval can be subjected to conditions on objective criteria
or on uncertain criteria. Especially in the latter case, approval procedures can be the source of
corrupt practices. In certain countries, the relation between the foreign direct investor and the
156
157

With the United States Army representing more than 90 % of the missiles business of that company.
Lenovo Group Ltd. is indeed controlled or at least influenced by the Chinese government.
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administrative authorities has to be laid down in an investment contract, generally containing
conditions tailored to the specific circumstances.

The competent authority for monitoring the notifications or for screening and granting
the approvals varies from one country to another. It can for example be a Ministry, the Central
Bank, a statistic division of the administration or a specialized entity. While in some
countries, there is only one centralized entity, in other systems there exist a network of
decentralized authorities spread over the national territory. Additionally, one specific
authority can be competent for all investments, or there can be several competent authorities
deciding on the specific factors, such as the kind of investment or the amounts involved.

Over the last years, more countries have progressively evolved towards a wider
application of the notification procedure and consequently a less extensive use of the approval
and screening mechanism. For example, one of the important novelties and objectives of
Turkey’s recent New Foreign Direct Investment Law, enacted June 5 2003, is the shift from
an investment screening and approval system to an investment notification system.158 Article
4 § 3 of this new law provides moreover that the information foreign investors are to submit
may only be used for statistical purposes.159

The artificiality to a certain extent of the separate analytical discussion of the various
national determinants can once more be illustrated by the following observation. It would a
priori appear that a national system applying a notification procedure is more hospitable
158

Articles 1 and 4 of Turkey’s New Foreign Direct Investment Law. See also: ANADOLU FOUNDATION, Foreign
Direct Investment in Turkey (http://www.anadolu.be/2004-07/30.html), highlighting the most important
novelties of the New Foreign Direct Investment Law, amongst which the shift from an ‘investment permission
system’ to an ‘investment monitoring system’ and concluding that this law represents a milestone in decades of
progressive further liberalization of the Turkish FDI policy and legislation.
159
Article 4 § 3 states: “Foreign investors shall submit the statistical information on their investments according
to the procedures and principles to be determined by a regulation to be enacted by the Undersecretariat. Such
information cannot be used as evidence or for any means other than for statistical purposes”.
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towards FDI inflows than a country subjecting every foreign investment to prior approval and
screening. However, this conclusion might not be correct if the compared systems are viewed
as a whole, and where, for example, the former system might contain substantially broader
foreign ownership restrictions and exclude a more significant number of sectors from foreign
investment, than the latter.

Finally, it can be mentioned that FDI activity involves many other legal issues than
those strictly related to foreign investment law. Consequently, other types of notifications
and/or approvals can be required when proceeding with an investment abroad. We can, for
example, refer to prior antitrust clearances. Such procedures, although in principle not aimed
at FDI and applying to both domestically-owned entities as to foreign investors, also
constitute potential barriers to FDI. However, these issues fall out of the scope of the present
paper. As to the issue of exchange control approvals, this will be further developed in the
section regarding the exit of FDI. However, this issue is also important at the moment of the
entry of FDI because some national systems subject such inflows to foreign exchange control
approvals with the sanction of non-compliance potentially being the impossibility to repatriate
profits, interests, royalties or the originally invested capital.
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3.1.2. SECTOR-SPECIFIC EXCLUSIONS OF FDI

The present section focuses on that part of national FDI laws that prohibits foreign
investment in particular sectors of the host economy or in specific circumstances. The scope
of activities open to foreign investment varies substantially across national systems. While in
certain States foreign investors have the freedom to participate in virtually all economic
activities, in others there can be an important number of circumstances or sectors (or subsectors) in which foreign investment is excluded. Consequently, because the economic
activities carved out for foreign investment can be quite substantial, the use of the terms
‘sector-specific exclusions of FDI’ is somehow misleading in the latter situation.

The number and kind of foreign investment prohibitions can thus vary largely across
national systems, and this issue in combination with the underlying rationale for the carveouts applied in a specific regime, are representative indicators of a country’s FDI policy and
its extent of openness towards foreign investment.

Virtually all legal systems, including those of the countries that are considered as
having some of the most liberal and FDI hospitable countries in the world, do exclude foreign
ownership in particular sectors or on specific grounds. However, in countries characterized by
a high level of hospitability towards FDI, such prohibitions are often limited to a significant
extent to sectors or circumstances in which national security concerns, or at least superior
national interests, are involved. The latter can include sub-sectors in the energy industry with
the objective of ensuring the provision of energy to the local populations at all times.
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The exact definition of the terms national security or superior national interest depends
on the contents of each national framework. In that regard, once can refer to the discussion of
the American and French system in the former section.160 In order to further illustrate this
complex issue, an example of the French provisions already discussed in the former section
will be further developed as well as the impact of EU-law and jurisprudence on the legal
systems of the Member States. Thus, national security and higher national interests are
protected in France by the combination of the mandatory submission of certain FDI activities
to an approval procedure with the administrative authorities,161 more precisely the Minister of
Economic Affairs, and the entitlement of the latter to control transactions and to deny
authorization to foreign investors regarding specific categories of transactions. These
categories relate to situations where a potential danger of imperilment of national security,
public health or other similar public order interests exists. The relevant provisions in that
respect are included in the French Monetary and Financial Code.162 The new provisions of
the French Monetary and Financial Code regarding this matter contain a more detailed
description of the circumstances in which prior authorization must be obtained and in which
an FDI activity can be refused. This is a result of the judgment rendered by the Court of
Justice of the European Communities (CJEC) on March 14, 2000, at the occasion of a
primary ruling referred to it by the French Conseil d’Etat in the case Association Église de
Scientologie de Paris & Scientology International Reserves Trust163 v. the Prime Minister of
the Republic of France.164 This case demonstrates the impact of European Law and of the
case law of the CJEC on the national law of the member states of the European Union. The
160

It results from the American system discussed in the former section that a particular FDI exclusion can result
from a general provision prohibiting foreign investment in a specific sector or in particular circumstances or
depend on the outcome of a specific governmental review procedure.
161
As will be explained in a latter subsection, in the French FDI legislation, the general rule is that FDI
transactions are only subjected to an administrative declaration obligation (moreover, many operations are even
dispensed of this administrative formality), and the approval and review procedure is thus only applicable in
limited circumstances, which are related to specific concerns of national interest.
162
Articles L 151-3, R 153-2 and R 153-10 of the Monetary and Financial Code.
163
The former being a French association an the latter a UK trust.
164
C-54/99.
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key EC Treaty provision involved is article 56(1) which provides, in the context of the
essential EU principle of freedom of movement of capital: “within the framework of the
provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on the movement of capital between
Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited. … The
provisions … shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States: … to take all requisite
measures to prevent infringements of national law and regulations, in particular in the field
of taxation and the prudential supervision of financial institutions, or to lay down procedures
for the declaration of capital movements for purposes of administrative or statistical
information, or to take measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or public
security”. The French state had refused a capital transfer from a trust established in the United
Kingdom and an association constituted under French Law. The administrative decision was
based on the French provisions requiring prior authorization for direct investments, which
could represent a threat to public policy or public security. The CJEC first recalled prior
European case law stating that “public policy and public security may be relied on only if
there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society;
moreover, those derogations must not be misapplied so as, in fact, to serve purely economic
ends. … Second, measures which restrict the free movement of capital may be justified on
public- policy and public-security grounds only if they are necessary for the protection of the
interests which they are intended to guarantee and only in so far as those objectives cannot be
attained by less restrictive means.”165 The Court proceeds by highlighting that the mere use of
the terms ‘public policy’ and ‘public security’ without any further precision, in the context of
an FDI approval requisition, is too vague and thus does not enable foreign investors to
determine the specific circumstances in which prior administrative approval is required and
does not enable them to apprise their rights in the light of article 56(1) of the EC Treaty.166 In
165
166

C-54/99, points 17 and 18.
C-54/99, points 21-23.
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light of the legal uncertainty resulting from this lack of precision, the Court concluded that the
use of general terms for the determination of the categories of investments affected by an FDI
approval system is precluded by the aforementioned EC Treaty provision.

The Colombian FDI regime offers an example of a system that almost exclusively
contains prohibitions that are considered imperative to protect the national security. The
sectors involved are the defense industry, national security provision, disposal of hazardous
wastes and real estate. The relation of the latter with national security concerns, at first glance,
seem distant. However, viewed in the context of the particular problems the country faces and
the rationale of the exclusion, i.e., to hinder money laundering, there is a clearer connection
between the prohibition and national security.

It is not infrequent that beyond concerns of national security and superior national
interests, FDI hospitable countries moreover exclude a few other sectors of their economy,
generally because they are considered sensitive. Those sectors are often some of the
following: banking and financial services, mail and telecommunications, broadcasting,
aviation, maritime shipping, real estate, specific national resources and/or governmental
contracting.

Whether excluded for national security reasons, superior national interests or because
considered as sensitive sectors, and apart from those already listed above, the sectors most
frequently excluded for foreign investment are nuclear energy generation, uranium and toxic
industry, military equipment, hydrocarbons, mining, air and sea transport, electric power,
agriculture, forestry, health services, insurance, security services, brokerage, customs
agencies, publishing, fishing and the uranium industry.
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On the other hand, several FDI regimes exclude a relatively significant and sometimes
substantial number of sectors for foreign investment. In the latter case, the safeguarding of
national security grounds or specific superior national interests, or even the sensitive character
of the industry, as the justifying rationales of FDI exclusions are generally present though in
addition to the objectives of protecting the economic interests of the locals, warranting the
host county’s control over its economy, or avoiding or reducing possible negative impacts of
certain FDI operations. In some instances, the rules reserving certain sectors and sub-sectors
for the nationals are almost exclusively applied for the latter purposes only. For example, in
Ghana, several enterprises are wholly reserved for Ghanaians. However, none of the FDI
exclusions provided for in the Ghana Investment Promotion Act are motivated by national
security concerns. By virtue of Section 18 of that statute are excluded from any kind167 of
foreign investment the following economic activities: “1. The sale of anything whatsoever in
a market, petty trading, hawking or selling from a kiosk at any place; 2. Operation of taxi
service and car hire service (a non-Ghanaian may undertake this service provided he has a
minimum fleet of ten new vehicles); 3. All aspects of pool betting business and lotteries,
except football pools; 4) Operation of beauty saloons and barber shops.”
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Small-scale

mining is also reserved for Ghanaians but this by virtue of the Minerals and Mining Law of
1986.

India is a good example of a system where foreign investment is prohibited in a
relatively wide variety of sectors and sub-sectors, such as the legal services sector, the retail
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The carving out for foreign investment of those economic sectors is thus not restricted to FDI inflows.
Section 18 of, and Schedule to, the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act of 1994. Section 18 states: “The
enterprises specified in the Schedule to this Act are reserved for Ghanaians and may not be undertaken by a
non-Ghanaian”.
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businesses, agriculture and plantations.169 China’s FDI framework constitutes another
example of a system that contains exclusions motivated by the desire to protect the host
economy and the economic interests of the nationals.

Comparing a country’s hospitality to foreign investment from the perspective of the
number of sectors and sub-sectors they carve out from FDI streams, is not an air-tight
undertaking. A close look at their legal system is necessary. The fact that specific sectors of
an economy are often exclusively reserved to the State offers a clear example of the
difficulties involved in such comparative operations. In order to correctly compare, an
analysis is needed the foreign investment sectors that are excluded as well as the national and
foreign investment sectors that are excluded due to being reserved to the State. To
hypothetically illustrate this issue, the question could be raised whether a country that
proceeds with extensive nationalizations but excludes certain of the involved sectors to its
nationals (or applying a substantial cap on foreign ownership) offers more economic
opportunities for foreign investors than a system without any FDI exclusions but with many
sectors reserved for the State. Moreover, national provisions excluding FDI in specific sectors
or circumstances are closely linked with the issue of restrictions on foreign equity ownership
and decision-making power, as well as with the issue of local investors benefiting from more
favorable treatment than foreign investors. For example, carving out tout court foreign
investment from a specific sector can be relatively close to rules that substantially limit
foreign ownership in that sector.170 For example, in Belgium the local public transport and the
national railways are legal monopolies, while this is no longer the case in Brazil since 1995.
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Except for tea plantations: FDI in such projects is allowed. However, prior approval is required and there are
conditions of minimum local ownership of the equity.
170
E.g.: The extent to which a foreign ownership cap of 10 per cent applicable in a particular sector constitutes a
barrier to FDI can be considered closer, from a practical and economic point of view, as closer to a straight
carve-out , than of a foreign ownership cap of for example 75 per cent. Conceptually however, provisions
containing foreign ownership restrictions are somehow closer as compared to provisions excluding FDI.
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Although neither of the systems applies and FDI exclusion in its technical sense in those
sectors, the Brazilian local transport and railways sectors are accessible for foreign direct
investors, while this is not the case in Belgium.
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3.1.3. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS

An analytical distinction can be made between three broad kinds of foreign ownership
restrictions: asset ownership restrictions in general, real estate acquisition restrictions and
equity ownership restrictions. The latter category could be conceptualized as including both
restrictions on the ownership of equity as well as restrictions on the foreign decision-making
power in a foreign direct investment entity.

These rules containing foreign equity ownership restrictions are discussed in a
separate section because they are strictly spoken prohibitions, although conceptually they can
also be viewed as a form of entry conditions, i.e., from the perspective that local collaboration
in the foreign investment entity is imposed as an entry condition. Requirements of local
participation need to be viewed as conditions and not as prohibitions when they do not
constitute strict legal caps on foreign participation though as prerequisites to be entitled to a
more favorable treatment. In any event, it is clear that both mandatory local ownership and
participation as well as rules ‘discriminating’ against foreign direct investment entities where
such requirements are not met, constitute barriers to FDI inflows, i.e., render the country’s
investment climate less hospitable... The issue of national provisions favoring entities which
meet certain requirements of minimum local ownership or control over entities that do not do
so, is narrowly related with the issue of national treatment versus the favoring of local over
foreign investors, i.e., with the treatment of foreign investors in comparison with their local
counterparts, which is analyzed in the next section. Within the same FDI regime, both
mandatory restrictions on one hand and restrictive conditions to benefit from more favorable
treatment on the other hand, can coexist.
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While a country’s local law does not establish limits on foreign equity ownership or
voting power, save in a limited number of specific circumstances or sectors, other countries
implement minimum local equity ownership or voting power requirements as a rule. Several
FDI regimes only apply foreign equity ownership restrictions in the context of the
implementation of reciprocity requirements in a limited number of specific sectors. The issue
of foreign ownership restrictions consequently interacts in part with the rules regarding
reciprocity requirements analyzed in a latter section.

A significant number of national FDI systems contain provisions that prohibit foreign
equity ownership above a specific cap. The cap is generally expressed in a percentage of the
equity of the foreign direct investment entity but can also be defined as a limitation on the
voting power or management control.171 The application of a cap on the foreign ownership of
equity in a foreign investment entity can be applicable in general or only in specific sectors of
the host economy. In addition, the percentage can vary, sometimes substantially, from one
sector to another. Several national systems in which foreign equity ownership restrictions
apply as a general rule exempt foreign investors from it when they establish in specific zones,
often called ‘free zones’ or ‘special economic zones’. However, such exemption on the
foreign ownership cap is most often a direct result of the export requirements, which generally
apply to the business entities established in such zones. Nevertheless, even when not
established in such zones, national provisions can provide for exemptions of the local
collaboration requirement at the condition that all or a large part of the production of the
foreign direct investment entity is destined for export. In some regimes where the limitation of
foreign equity ownership is the rule, exemptions can nevertheless be granted to particular
foreign investors in specific circumstances.
171

For an analysis of the two key elements in the ownership of a firm (control and the right to receive the net
earnings), see KRAAKMAN, Reinier H. et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law; a comparative and functional
approach., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.
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Amongst the FDI rules imposing local ownership or participation, a distinction can be
made between those situations where it is allowed to have majority equity ownership and
control in the foreign direct investment entity, and those where it is not. In many countries,
both situations can be found: while in some sectors of the economy foreign investors can owe
more than 50 percent of the equity up to 100 percent, in other sectors the cap on foreign
ownership can be 49 percent or less.

In countries such as Qatar and Oman the rules containing restrictions on foreign equity
ownership are relatively simple. The former country applies as a rule a cap on foreign equity
ownership of 49 percent. The latter applies different caps in function of the sectors in which
are invested though 49 percent as a rule and 70 percent as a maximum cap. Systems like the
UAE and India on the other hand, have a far more complicated and hybrid system. In the
UAE, one of the four main foreign investment laws, the Federal Industry Law, already applies
several different caps and rules. For example, a minimum of 51 percent of national ownership
is required for industrial projects, and the project must be managed by a national or by a board
of directors with a majority of nationals. However, the requirement of a majority of local
ownership is partially or even totally waived when occurring in so-called free zones.

The system of India is possibly the regime containing most variety in that regard. Not
only are different rules applicable in function of various groups of economic activities, but the
percentage fixed as a cap on foreign equity ownership for particular categories is, at various
occasions, not absolute in the sense that exceptions or derogations can be obtained, depending
on certain circumstances or on prior authorization in the context of specific derogation
approval procedures. Moreover, the Indian system excludes FDI from several sectors of its
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economy. It has already been mentioned that sectors such as the retail businesses and the legal
services sectors are not accessible for foreign investors. In other words, in those sectors
foreign equity ownership is not restricted but prohibited. In several sectors the general rule is
a maximum of 51 percent foreign ownership. This is the case of the food processing industry
and of the health and education services sector. However, in certain sub-sectors of the food
processing industry, a more FDI restrictive percentage applies while in other sub-sectors or in
specific circumstances a higher percentage can be approved by the competent authorities. The
same is true for the health and education services, where, in particular circumstances, the
foreign investor can be authorized to own the entire equity. Other trends of the Indian rules
governing equity ownership limitations render the system even more complex. The system of
mandatory divestiture of part of the equity within a certain number of years when certain
proportions of equity ownership are reached is increasingly used by the Indian system and this
diminishes the transparency. The example of the FDI regime applicable to tea plantations is
representative in that regard: a foreign direct investor can own up to 100 percent of the equity
but there is mandatory divestment of 26 percent of the equity to locals within a period of
maximum fiver years. Since relatively recently a similar mandatory divestment system is
applicable in certain sub-sectors of the telecommunications industry as well as in the so-called
business-to-business e-commerce. Furthermore, the complexity of the system is increased
because of the fact that many rules change relatively frequently. The Indian
telecommunications sector is a clear example of continuously evolving and changing FDI
rules, and this since the decision in 1994 to privatize the sector in order to attract private
investment including foreign investment, in order to rapidly improve telecommunications
facilities and reach universal service, considered a key issue in order to facilitate a more rapid
development of the country on the economic and social levels.172 In 2005, the cap on foreign
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Indian Telegraph Act of 1885 as amended, Indian Wireless Act, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act
of 28 March 1997, and Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Amendment Ordinance of 24 January 2000.
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equity ownership was increased from 49 to 74 percent in several areas of the sector, including
mobile service provision. However, the new rule requires that at least one Indian shareholder
owns a share of 10 percent in the company. The rationale behind the latter requirement is to
ensure that there would be at least one Indian person or entity with a major stake and a
significant influence over the management of the company.

A strong preference for the joint venture as the structure of such required collaboration
has been observed in many countries for a large variety of reasons.173 In occasions this result
from the existence of tax advantages as compared to a wholly foreign owned direct
investment entity. In other occasions the presence of a local partner is simply preferable for
business-cultural reasons.

The phenomenon of foreign investment laws prohibiting or restricting the acquisition
of real estate by foreign investors has significantly reduced over the years but remains
relatively present in many systems. Amongst recent changes that occurred from that
perspective can be referred to the Turkish New Foreign Direct Investment Law of 2003 which
removed discriminatory treatment between domestically-owned enterprises and direct foreign
investment entity authorizes foreign investors in the right to acquire and owe real property in
Turkey. Article 3.d. of that law indeed states: “Companies may freely acquire real estate or
limited rights in rem through a legal entity in Turkey established or with participation by
foreign investors, provided such acquisitions are permitted for Turkish citizens.” There is
thus no longer discriminatory treatment between domestically-owned enterprises and direct
foreign investment entities.
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SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1999, 104. For more information about the use of the structure of a joint venture in the context of FDI and on the
variety of reasons for the observed strong preference for that structure, see: SORNARAJAH, M., Law of
International Joint Ventures, Longman, Singapore, 1992.
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Another example of progress towards more FDI hospitality from this particular
perspective is the regulatory evolution of the system of Saudi Arabia, where until recently
foreign investors were not allowed to acquire or own real estate property. Since 2000 however
they are entitled to own the required real estate for their licensed business as well as for the
private residences of resident non-saudis. However, this right is subject to various conditions
such as the total cost of the investment project has to be superior to SR 30 million and the
ownership must be retained during at least five years174.

In China the land is property of the public and consequently foreign investors can not
own land though only have long-term leases for land use. In the UAE private land ownership
exists bus is reserved for Emiratis. However, recently there has been some evolution in this
field. The Emirate of Dubai, followed by the Emirates of Ajman and Ras Al Khaimah,
decided to establish a system of so-called free hold real estate ownership in specific zones.
This system is however not yet transparently defined.

174

New Saudi Real Estate Law, Royal Decree nr. M/15.
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3.1.4. ENTRY CONDITIONS AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Countries that provide for entry conditions and performance requirements in their laws
and regulations mainly pursue this to maximize the benefits that can result from FDI for the
host economy. Although performance and commitment requirements relate to the post-entry
operation of the investment entity, they are technically spoken entry conditions, and therefore
they have been included in the category of rules that conditioning the entry of FDI.

A first group of conditions that can be encountered in an FDI system are the
capitalization requirements. Capitalization requirements can be defined as requirements “that
a foreign investor making entry should bring in all or a certain percentage of it from
overseas.”175 Such requirements find their main rationale in avoiding the raising and using of
local capital for investments which in part serve the interests of foreign investors, while this
capital is then unavailable for local projects. The requirement of bringing in a minimum
capital was recently banned in Turkey by its 2003 New Foreign Direct Investment Law.176

A second group of requirements are those related to the level of employment of locals,
i.e., local participation quotas. Provisions requiring that a minimum percentage of nationals be
employed can be applied at the level of the whole direct investment entity or at a specific
level such as the management or the research department. Such requirements aim not only at
increasing local employment but also to ensure the transfer of technology or management
skills to nationals of the host economy.
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SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1999, 106.
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Article 3.a.1. of Turkish New Foreign Direct Investment Law.
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Another kind of condition frequently applied in FDI systems are performance
requirements. Performance requirements can be defined as “operating expectations demanded
of foreign owned enterprises.”177 A specific performance requirement of a host country can
have a rather general application or be limited to particular sectors. The most frequent forms
of performance requirements are export requirements (export quotas requirements), local
content requirements and trade balancing requirements.

Export quotas, i.e., the requirement that a percentage of the production of the foreign
direct investment entity be destined for export finds its main rationale in the fact that export
can provide the exporting host country with important revenues and contribute intensively to
its economic growth. Export quotas as entry and performance requirements are usually not
found in the general frameworks of developed countries. Those countries can nevertheless
apply export quotas as a condition to benefit from certain incentives, such as a less
burdensome tax regime.
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SEID, Sherif, H., Global Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2002, 37.
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3.1.5. RECIPROCITY REQUIREMENTS

The access by foreign direct investors to the host economy in general or to certain
specific sectors can be conditioned upon reciprocity requirements. The use of reciprocity
requirements varies substantially amongst the different national systems.

France only applies reciprocity conditions in a small number of sectors. Moreover, this
FDI restriction only applies to natural persons or enterprises which are not nationals of
member states of the European Union or the European Economic Area, i.e., to non-EU and
non EEA-investors. Additionally, the number of fields in which reciprocity requirements were
applied gradually diminished over the years, and are expected to further diminish. Moreover,
several of the sectors subject to reciprocity condition are not significant. Reciprocity
requirements apply in the sectors of telecommunications, audio-visual communications,
publishing, hydrocarbons, waterfalls and tour guide-interpreters. In the telecommunications
sector, the restrictions results from the French Posts and Telecommunications Code according
to which the mandatory license will be refused or withdrawn by the Minister responsible for
telecommunications if more than 20 percent of the equity capital or the voting rights of the
company are directly or indirectly owned by foreign nationals of countries with whom France
has not signed an international agreement containing a reciprocity clause applicable to the
telecommunication sector.178 In the absence of an international agreement in the field of
publishing and containing a reciprocity provision, concluded between France and the source
country, the same cap of 20 percent of the equity capital or voting rights is applicable to the
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Article L33-1-B-III of the Posts and Telecommunications Code. The article defines foreign nationals as “any
natural person of foreign nationality or any company the majority of shares of which is not held, directly or
indirectly, by natural or legal persons of French nationality” and precises that the reciprocity requirement does
not apply to EU and non EEA-investors (Article L33-1-B-III-§§2-3). Identical or slightly differently formulated
definitions of the concept of foreign nationals can be found in the other French laws limiting foreign ownership
of equity capital or voting rights in the mentioned sectors.
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sub-sector of French-language periodicals of the publishing sector, by virtue of the Press
Reform Act 86-897 of August 1, 1986,179 and to the sub-sector of French-language terrestrial
Hertzian radio and television services of the audio-visual communications sector, by virtue of
the Communications Liberty Act 86-1067 of September 30, 1986.180 Those restrictions
consequently do not apply respectively to foreign-language periodicals and radio and
television. Access to the profession of tour guide-interpreter is dependent on a reciprocity
requirement by virtue of the Act 92-645 on the exercise of activities related to the sale of
travel, travel accommodation and related services of July 13, 1992.181

The reciprocity requirement applying in the hydrocarbons industry is representative of
the impact and importance of EU law in the field of FDI. In order to optimize the exploration
and production of hydrocarbons in the territories of the EU member states, it was considered
necessary to increase competition in the European hydrocarbons industry by removing FDI
barriers for non-EU and non-EEA investors.182 This led to the adoption by the European
Parliament and the Council on 30 May 2004 of Directive 94/22/EC on the conditions for
granting and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and production of
hydrocarbons,183 whose article 2.2. establishes that those investors should enjoy national
treatment: “Member States shall ensure that there is no discrimination between entities as
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Article 17 of the Press Reform Act 86-897 of 1 August 1986.
Article 40 of the Communications Liberty Act 86-1067 of 30 September 1986.
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Article 13 of the Act 92-645 on the exercise of activities related to the sale of travel, travel accommodation
and related services of 13 July 1992,, implemented by Decree 94-490 of 15 June 1994.
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Considerations 7 and 10 of Directive 94/22/EC on the conditions for granting and using authorizations for
the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons of 30 May 1994 of the European Parliament and
the Counsel: “Whereas the Community largely depends on imports for its hydrocarbon supply; whereas it is
consequently advisable to encourage the best possible prospection, exploration and production of the recourses
located in the Community; … Whereas steps must be taken to ensure the non-discriminatory access to and
pursuit of activities relating to the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons under conditions
which encourage greater competition in this sector and thereby to favour the best prospection, exploration and
production of resources in Member States and to reinforce the integration of the internal energy market”.
183
Official journal nr. L 164 , 30/06/1994 P. 0003.
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regards access to and exercise of these activities.”184 Although the directive does not
establish a classic reciprocity requirement, it provides in its article 8.4 for a procedure by
which Member States can file a request to the European Commission in order for the latter to
propose the European Council to grant authorization to refuse access to a foreign direct
investor controlled by nationals of a country that “is not granting Community entities, as
regards access to or exercise of the activities [of prospecting, exploring for and producing
hydrocarbons], treatment comparable to that which the Community grants entities from that
third country”.

184

The last paragraph of article 2.2. of Directive 94/22/EC on the conditions for granting and using
authorizations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons nevertheless precises that
Member States can refuse access to those activities to entities of non-EU and non-EEA countries on national
security grounds.
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3.2.

RULES APPLICABLE TO THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTORS AND THEIR
INVESTMENTS

For the purposes of an analytical discussion of the legal treatment of foreign investors
and their investments in a host economy, a distinction will be made between the rules defining
the treatment of foreign investors in comparison with their local counterparts, the legal
protection and guarantees on which they can prevail (which includes the issue of
expropriation of foreign direct investment) and finally, the potential incentives of which they
can benefit and the applicable tax regime.
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3.2.1. TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN COMPARISON WITH NATIONALS

National FDI policies and their legal translation can be distinguished based on the
treatment the regulatory and legal framework of a country reserves for foreign direct investors
in comparison with their local counterparts. This issue is a substantial determinant when
measuring a system’s openness and attractiveness to FDI. While some systems generally treat
foreign direct investors in the same manner as the local investors (national treatment) others
favor the latter over the former (discriminatory treatment). It occurs that in certain occassions
or areas a system favors foreign investors over the nationals.

The legal principles of national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment are
related though clearly different. In the OECD Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment of
April 24, 1998,185 the principle of national treatment in the context of international investment
is defined as the obligation of the host country to accord to foreign investors and to their
investments “treatment no less favourable than the treatment it accords in like circumstances
to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, operation,
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and sale or other disposition of investments”; the
principle of most-favoured-nation treatment as the obligation for the host country to accord to
foreign investors and to their investments “treatments no less favourable than the treatment it
accords in like circumstances to investors of any other [country] and to the investments of
investors of any other [country], with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, and sale or other disposition of
185

This is the last draft used in the context of the last round of negotiations in the light of the adoption of a
highly investment-protection and investment-liberalization oriented Multilateral Agreement on Investment, open
to both OECD and non-OECD countries. The negotiations failed so no such Agreement was adopted and no
further attempts have been made within the OECD-structure (the latest version of the text which was negotiated
can be found on: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/40/1895712.pdf. The attempts to create a multilateral
agreement liberalizing and protecting foreign investment is now focused on by several developed countries in the
framework of the WTO.
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investments.”186 The definitions of the principles of national treatment and most-favourednation contained in the 2004 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty are almost
identical in formulation.187

A distinction can thus be made between those systems where the favoring of local
investors is the rule not the exception, and those countries where national treatment is the
general rule applicable to foreign direct investors and their investments. Almost every country,
if not all, which reserves national treatment for foreign direct investors, implements
nevertheless a certain number of sector-specific FDI restrictions in the sense that local
investors result favored over foreign investors. This is illustrated by several examples in the
next paragraphs.

The FDI legislation of many states explicitly stresses in their legal instruments that
foreign investors benefit from national treatment. In Turkey, for example, the principle of
national treatment of foreign direct investors is laid down in article 3.a. of the New Foreign
Direct Investment Law, which is titled ‘Freedom to Invest and National Treatment’ and reads
as follows: “Unless stipulated by international agreements and other special laws: 1) Foreign
Investors are free to make foreign direct investors in Turkey; 2) Foreign Investors shall be
subject to equal treatment with domestic investors”.
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Article 3 of the draft of 28 April 1998, of the negotiations text of the OECD Multilateral Investment
Agreement.
187
Article 3 defines the principle of national treatment, article 4 the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment.
Article 3.3. contains a supplementary formulation in order to highlight explicitly that the same principle that is
applicable on the federal state level is to be applied on the regional level: “The treatment to be accorded by a
Party under paragraphs 1 and 2 means, with respect to a regional level of government, treatment no less
favorable than the treatment accorded, in like circumstances, by that regional level of government to natural
persons resident in and enterprises constituted under the laws of other regional levels of government of the Party
of which it forms part, and to their respective investments”.
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The derogations to national treatment applicable in legal systems abiding as a general
rule to that principle vary substantially form one country to another. There are nevertheless
certain exceptions that are relatively common to such systems. Common exceptions to the
principle of national treatment are those based on considerations of national security, which
was extensively discussed in a former section. In developing countries, it is frequent that the
general rule of national treatment is derogated to a certain extent based on development
objectives.

When a state does not accord national treatment to foreign direct investors and their
investments, a question that surges is the treatment to which they are entitled. This varies
substantially from one national system to another. However, this is an issue where national
frameworks have significantly been impacted by international law in general and particularly
by international provisions agreed upon by the concerned State. In the first chapter it was
mentioned that certain authors consider the standard of fair and equitable treatment as of
customary international law. In any event, such provision of fair and equitable treatment is
often included in bilateral investment treaties involving a country which system does not
apply higher standards. A bilateral investment treaty can of course also accord a higher
standard of treatment of foreign investors such as national treatment of the nationals of the
Contracting State, most-favored-nation treatment, both of the latter, or any other standards.

The regulatory and legal frameworks applicable in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is
a good example of a regime that favors local over foreign investors.188 In Saudi Arabia, a
favored treatment is applied to companies that comply with certain minimum local ownership
requirements. Although this still constitutes a constraint to FDI, the present system is
188

UAE’s four major laws concerning foreign investment are: the federal companies law, the commercial
agencies law, the federal industry law, and the government tenders law.
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substantially more open than the system this country applied of prohibiting foreign direct
investors unless they had local partners, requirement that is thus presently no longer
mandatory.
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3.2.2. LEGAL PROTECTION AND GUARANTEES, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF EXPROPRIATIONS

FDI legislation often includes a provision guaranteeing compensation in case of
expropriation of the investment property. Such provisions have a ‘signaling function’ and are
especially important in countries with a substantial expropriations history.189

The WB Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment recommend that
States only expropriate in pursuance of a public purpose and without discrimination between
nationals and foreign investors.190 Those guidelines also stress the importance of an adequate,
effective and appropriate compensation in case of expropriation, and the guidelines consider
the determination of the amount by reference to the fair market value as a reasonable
mechanism.

A substantial variety of regimes exist from the perspective of legal protection and
guarantees to foreign direct investors and their investments. In each of the OECD countries
expropriation is expressly regulated by material laws and only occurs for public purposes
without discrimination against foreign investors, and results in an adequate compensation
which can be appealed before an impartial judicial system. In other jurisdictions the rules are
not very transparent. However, considering the importance of foreign investment, most
countries, even those without a transparent legal system or that didn’t concluded a BIT
containing a ‘fair and adequate compensation’ provision, rarely proceed with expropriations
without adequate compensation. In China for example the law prohibits expropriation of
foreign investment except under special circumstances but without explaining what is meant
by such circumstances. The Chinese legislation also states that compensation is due in such
189

SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1999, 95.
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Article 4 of the WB Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment.
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circumstances but once again does not contain any definition of what kind of compensation
the foreign investor is entitled. Although the clear absence of transparency, the Chinese
government has not proceeded to outright expropriations without adequate compensation.
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3.2.3. FDI INCENTIVES AND TAX REGIME

Incentives measures in the context of foreign investment, when broadly defined,
includes all governmental measures or actions from which foreign direct investors benefit or
could benefit. Defined more narrowly, it refers to measures which are directly in relation with
the foreign investment and that impact directly on the facto cost of a project or on the returns
from the sale of a project’s product.191 The narrow definition, contrary to the broader one,
does not include measures to improve the host country’s infrastructure, the relaxing of
environmental or labor standards, or investment promotion activities, but rather measures
such as subsidies (e.g., a cash grant), holidays or other tax incentives, exemption of import
duties for equipment or raw material, and many others.192 For the purposes of the present
section, the narrow definition is adopted.

Providing incentives is a frequently used strategy to attract foreign direct investors.
Because host countries are especially interested in FDI that is most productive for its national
economy, incentives are often only available to selected categories of foreign direct investors.
In other words, States generally tend to only grant incentives for FDI that is expected to have
a beneficial effect on the host economy. As a result of the already mentioned principle of
State sovereignty, the only limitation to the right of a country to grant or deny incentives at its
discretion is the ius cogens prohibition of discrimination on racial grounds. Furthermore, in
order to ensure beneficial effect it is not unusual that the incentives are conditioned. For
example, the transmission of specific knowledge to locals can be one of the conditions to
benefit from a particular tax provision.
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SEID, Sherif H., Global Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2002, 40.
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The offering of incentives (e.g., tax incentives or subsidies when technology is
imported), can pursue the same objectives as entry conditions (e.g., importing the latest
technology) and performance requirements. There is nevertheless a qualitative psychological
difference between both strategies. The latter appears indeed more hostile towards FDI, as
opposed to actively attracting FDI by incentives. The contents of a particular incentive does
not in se determines the decision making process of the foreign direct investors. The specific
incentive has to be placed in the context of the country’s general investment climate. It is in
that context that UNCTAD stresses, “incentives are secondary to more fundamental
determinants, such as market size, access to raw materials and availability of skilled labour.
Investors generally tend to adopt a two-stage process when evaluating countries as
investment locations. In the first stage, they screen countries based on their fundamental
determinants. Only those countries that pass these criteria go on to the next stage of
evaluation where tax rates, grants and other incentives may become important. Thus, it is
generally recognized that investment incentives have only moderate importance in attracting
FDI.”193

The legal FDI framework of many states contains a variety of incentives to entice
foreign investment. The most commonly used attraction devices are financial incentives,
especially tax advantages. What has already been stated for FDI incentives in general, is also
true for tax advantages: they can be offered to foreign investors in general, but usually a state
limits the applicability of such provisions to specific categories of investors complying with a
set of conditions in order to maximize the benefits from productive FDI.194
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The stability and contents of a host country’s tax regime, especially of the provisions
directly affecting foreign investors, is an important element when appreciating the
attractiveness of its investment climate. The tax rate applicable on the relevant tax base and
the existence of double taxation treaties between countries are important factors for a potential
foreign direct investor.

The investment climate’s attractiveness can substantially increase when a host country
provides tax incentives applicable to foreign direct investors. The investors that can benefit
from specific tax incentives can be a fairly broad group or very specific and limited. A system
can contain tax incentives that are generally available to both local and foreign investors
complying with the conditions, but also tax incentives which are exclusively applicable to
foreign investors.

Tax holidays are one group of tax advantages that can be offered by home countries to
foreign direct investors. The applicability of such provisions can result in major advantages
for foreign direct investors. However, such tax exemptions are usually limited in time. In the
latter case, the duration can vary in function of many factors such as the specific sector
concerned, the particular region of the host country where the investment is located, the
nature of the potential benefits for the host country, the purported export percentage of the
activities of the foreign direct investment entity, the capital invested, etc.. Moreover the
exemption can be limited to a certain cap.

Brunei Darussalam’s Investment Incentives Order of 2001 contains a wide variety of
tax holiday regimes functioning in various parameters. Some of the circumstances in which
tax exemptions are awarded under that Order will briefly be discussed, for two purposes: to

110

illustrate the potential relative technicity and complexity of tax incentive provisions on one
hand, and to illustrate the interrelation between the different FDI determinants. A first
situation concerns a company that has been granted a pioneer certificate from the Minister of
Industry because the latter considered it in the public interest to do so. The company is
exempted from corporate tax, from taxes on imported duties on machinery, equipment,
building structures as well as from taxes on raw material not available or produced in the
country and intended for the production of the pioneer products, and this for a period of 5
years if the capital expenditure is above $500,000 but less than $2.5 million, 8 years if it is
above the latter amount, 11 years if the pioneer industry is located in Hi Tech Park, with
possible successive extensions of 5 years, but not exceeding 11 years for the first three
durations and 20 years for the duration for investments in the Hi Tech Park. A second tax
holiday circumstance overlaps in part with the former situation regarding pioneer enterprises,
and demonstrates the interrelation and interaction with other FDI factors such as, in casu, the
amount of equity held by nationals or residents, the idea of technology transfer and the export
percentage of the foreign direct investment entity. Indeed the concerned provision states that
companies which have been approved and certified by the Minister of Industry as an export
enterprise, and which export sales are at least 20 percent of the value of its total sales and at
least totalling $20,000, are exempted from income tax, import duties on machinery,
equipment, building structures and raw materials, for a period of 6 years if it is a pioneer
enterprise and 8 years if it is not (with possibility of extension but of no more than 11 years in
total), and are exempted for the aforementioned taxes for a period of 15 years when the export
enterprise has incurred or is intending to incur a fixed capital expenditure of not less than $50
million or not less than $500,000 if the following conditions are met: more than 40 percent of
paid-up capital of the enterprise is held by citizens and persons to whom a resident permit has
been granted by application of the Immigration Act of the concerned country, and the export
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enterprise will promote or enhance the economic or technological development of the
country.195 The discussed provisions are not exhaustive. Indeed, on the contrary, Brunei
Darussalam’s FDI system contains several other tax relief regimes. However, its FDI tax
incentives regime is certainly not one of the most complicated in the world.
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3.3.

RULES APPLICABLE TO THE EXIT OF FDI

It is clear that a foreign investor desirous to invest in a particular host economy will be
especially concerned with the regime applicable to transfer of funds. It would generally make
little economic sense to invest abroad if the profits could not be repatriated. The issue of the
repatriation of the invested capital is inherently similar to the repatriation of profits. More in
general, the free transfer of all funds related to foreign investments, including the payment of
royalties, interests, license fees, management fees, the repayment of the principal of loans,
and other payments related to the investment, is an essential issue.

The restrictions to free transfer of funds can be of various kinds and of different
degrees of burdensomeness. The domestic law can provide for the free transferability of funds
without prior authorization as a general rule. This is for example the case in Belgium and
France. Other systems apply an authorization system, which can be combined with the
requirement of documented evidence to support how the funds were gained, which is the case
of the Ghanaian and Chinese FDI regime. Ceilings can be applied on the transfer of funds in
general or on the transfer of certain funds or in certain circumstances. For example, in the
Indian system Indian firms that conclude an agreement with a foreign company in order to
obtain the transfer of technology can only grant royalties of maximum 5 percent on domestic
sales and 8 percent on the export sales. A similar system is applicable in India in the context
of agreements between Indian entities and foreign companies on the use of trademarks and
brand names. In the Columbian FDI system the original capital may freely be repatriated;
however, a fine applies if the repatriation occurs less than 12 months after the original
investment.

113

The trends towards further liberalization is also illustrated by multiple evolutions to
more FDI hospitability from this perspective. An illustration of this is Article 3.c. of the
recent Turkish New Foreign Direct Investment Law which establishes the principle of free
transfer of funds as follows: “Foreign investors can freely transfer abroad: profits, dividends,
proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of an investment, amounts arising
from license, management and similar agreements, and reimbursements and interest
payments arising from foreign loans through banks or special financial institutions”. Also,
Japan abandoned in 1998 the system of prior notification or prior approval, according to the
circumstances, in order to establish a system of ex post facto notification. In China, since
1996, profits not generated in foreign exchange can also be repatriated to the source country.
This was an important step because rules on the convertibility and on the transfer of foreign
exchange are a deterrent for foreign direct investors, especially when they are burdensome.
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3.4.

REMAINDER CATEGORY OF PROVISIONS GOVERNING OR IMPACTING FDI INFLOWS

In the context of the present paper it is not possible to exhaustively discuss all the
determinants of a FDI regime. In the next paragraphs will briefly be referred to certain
important determinants which could not be classified in one of the former categories of
provisions related to FDI inflows.

The regime applicable to the settlement of disputes between direct foreign investors
and the host State is a first important factor. The availability of international dispute
settlement procedures for such issues can constitute an important advantage for the former
and in sometimes a determinative factor in his decision making process. It results from
surveys carried out by a working group of the WB formed in order to prepare the WB
Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment that national investment
legislations usually establish the jurisdiction of the local courts over disputes between foreign
investors and the host country but simultaneously allow these parties to engage in dispute
settlement procedures such as international arbitration.196 The same conclusion was reached
for multilateral investment instruments. The mentioned surveys demonstrated on the contrary
that bilateral investment treaties almost always provide for international arbitration for
disputes between foreign direct investors and host countries.

National specificities can constitute FDI barriers compared to other national systems.
A representative example of this fact are public, semi-public or private legal monopolies, to
which was already referred. They have the effect of restraining the access to economic sectors
in the target economy, and consequently have to be taken into consideration when comparing
196
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the degree of openness towards FDI of different regulatory and legal frameworks. Sometimes,
a more profound analysis of a national system containing at first sight less restrictions towards
FDI than another national system which explicitly reserves in its FDI legislation several
sectors for domestically-owned entities, can result more mitigate.

Many other fields of law impact substantially on the extent to which the FDI climate
of a specific country is hospitable. Therefore it is imperative to acquire a thorough
understanding of those related fields. Antitrust laws can for example constitute an important
impediment to certain FDI projects. Other fields of law which are narrowly interconnected are
consumer protection law, product liability law, labour law, tax law, financial law,
environmental law, administrative law, intellectual property law, and even human rights law.
Minimum regulation in certain of those fields can constitute a strong incentive for certain
foreign direct investors. For example, the level of environmental standards197 and of
environmental protection pursued in a national framework, or the level of the labor standards,
often represent a major element of attraction or deterrence of the foreign direct investor.

The extent of compliance by a host country with the rule of law is also in many
occasions an essential factor for foreign direct investors. Factors such as the absence of an
independent judiciary, the absence of supremacy of law, the frequency of corruptive practices,
the unfair implementation of laws, the difficulty to enforce contracts or property rights, can
gravely deter foreign investors. More broadly, the transparency, predictability and clarity of a
national legal system renders the FDI climate more hospitable. In other words, the more the
national rules applicable to foreign direct investors and their investments are transparent and
clear, the more the competences and powers of the public authorities and public servants are
197
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well defined, and the less risk of discretion or arbitrariness affects the established rights of
foreign investors, the more reliable and thus the more attractive the national system becomes
for foreign investment projects. As stated before, in many occasions the provisions applicable
to FDI are contained in a code or in a certain number of laws or regulations; however this is
not a requirement nor a guarantee of transparency and clearness of a host country’s FDI
framework.
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CONCLUSIONS: EVALUATION OF THE INTERACTIONS WITHIN THE
AGGREGATE OF FDI DETERMINANTS

“It is a great privilege to be able to engage in
business in a country other than one’s own. By being
permitted to undertake commercial or manufacturing
activities or transactions through business incorporated in
another country, nationals of a foreign country will obtain
further benefits. Yet these local companies, as legal
entities of that country, are subject to local laws and
regulations; so that foreigners may have to accept a
number of restrictions in return for the advantages of
doing business through such local companies”.
Judge ODA198

It has extensively been demonstrated that a large majority of States on every continent
have been liberalizing or further liberalizing their investment policies and laws over the last
decades. The substantial impact and role of international instruments and organizations on
this progressive liberalization process has been stressed on both the global and international
regional levels. The narrow interrelation between international investment and international
trade, which both constitute key components of the ongoing economic globalization, has
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accelerated this trend towards more FDI hospitability, i.e., less legal and regulatory FDI
barriers.

The successive analysis of the legal determinants of FDI systems has demonstrated
that although in many occasions the legal evolutions towards more FDI openness have often
been significant and occasionally represented a thorough policy shift, substantial differences
remain among the many existing systems as well as among their extent of hospitability
towards FDI inflows. Everything indicates that these gaps between the different national
systems will further diminish. A milestone in such further evolution could be the reaching of a
binding multilateral investment agreement negotiated in the framework of the WTO.
However, if the differences will further diminish, they are nevertheless likely to remain
relatively considerable on several issues. Indeed, although virtually all countries recognize the
potential important benefits on balance of FDI for the host economy and its often substantial
impact on economic growth, many stress the necessity of regulating inflowing FDI in order to
warrant the conversion of potential benefits in effective advantages for its national’s well
being. In any event, it can thus be expected that the current national FDI laws of many
countries which currently apply more FDI restrictive rules than the systems of the countries
considered amongst the most open towards FDI inflows, will continue to periodically evolve
towards more FDI hospitability. The same can be stated of international instruments in the
context of FDI.

It is a difficult issue to compare different FDI systems amongst each other. It was
stressed that from a certain perspective each of the determinants, taken individually,
constitutes a first indication of a country’s FDI climate. However, it is clear that each
determinant only takes its full meaning when viewed in the context of the aggregate of FDI
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determinants. Stated otherwise, a country’s FDI system is not defined by the juxtaposition of
the analyzed legal factors but by the aggregate, including the interactions between the
determinants. For that reason it was highlighted that the used methodology, i.e., a successive
separate discussion of each of the definitional components of an FDI system is in part
artificial. However, such analytical decomposition of FDI systems in a series of national and
international determinants renders a first comparison between national systems more feasible.

In the next paragraphs, it is the objective to observe and discuss some of the most
striking trends in the interactions between different FDI determinants. However, the contents
of one or more specific determinants do not necessarily determine the rules governing other
determinants. Stated otherwise, the existence of certain general trends does not exclude
exceptions to it, as will be illustrated. The existence of general trends also renders a
classification of FDI systems on the basis of the discussed determinants and in function of
their extent of openness and attractiveness towards FDI inflows, more coherent. It is not our
objective to be exhaustive though to illustrate the phenomenon of interactions between
determinants, as well as to form the basis for more extensive research on the different
interactions. Although the extent of restrictiveness or openness towards foreign direct
investments could have been qualified numerically, it is beyond the scope of the present
paper.

A first trend that can be observed regards the relation between entry procedures, entry
conditions and performance requirements. The general trend is that the more burdensome the
entry procedure the more numerous and burdensome the entry conditions and performance
requirements. In graph I, a comparison is made for several countries between the entry
procedures on one hand and the entry conditions including performance requirements on the
other hand.
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The y axis of graph I indicates the extent of burdensomeness for foreign direct
investors of the entry conditions and performance requirements applicable in the selected
countries. The x axis indicates such information with regard to the entry procedures. The
more separated from the intersection of both axes the more burdensome the applicable rules
corresponding with the determinants. If a national system applies many entry conditions or
performance requirements, the country is located higher on the x axis than a country whose
rules are more liberal from that perspective. The proximity of the intersection on the y axis
indicates that foreign direct investors benefit from entry procedures which are not
burdensome or to a lesser extent. For example, countries were as a general rule foreign direct
investors only have to declare the investment i.e. a notification system, are encountered more
to the left of the y axis, than countries where a screening and approval procedure applies.
Countries where the latter procedure is characterized by relatively automatic approvals are
located more on the left than countries where the review is effective and burdensome.

The following abbreviations are used:

Albania
Australia
Belgium
Brunei Darussalam
Brazil
Canada
China
Chile
Colombia
France
Germany
Ghana
India
Japan
Kazakhstan
Russian Federation
Turkey

AL
AU
BE
BN
BR
CA
CN
CH
CO
FR
DE
GH
IN
JP
KZ
RU
TU
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AE
GB
US

.

United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States of America

Graph 1
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Entry Procedures

In order to explain the parameters on which the localization is based a series of
national rules and mechanisms will be mentioned, without the intent of being exhaustive and
occasionally repeating information contained in the former chapters. France is located to the
extreme left of the x axis, together with other countries where mere notification of FDI is the
rule. However, France is located more to the right than Germany as a result of the fact that in
a limited number of cases an investment has to be screened and approved. In the UAE the
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foreign direct investors can only proceed with their project after having obtained a license in
the context of an approval procedure which is transparent. Until recently Japan would have
been located more to the right. Indeed, Japan replaced its prior approval system by a
notification system. Nevertheless, prior approval remains necessary in several sectors such as
agriculture,

forestry,

oil,

electric

and

gas

utilities,

water

utilities,

aerospace,

telecommunications and leather manufacturing. However, in the latter sectors the approval is
mostly a formality, except when national security concerns are involved. Ghana no longer
applies a screening and approval system except in certain specific sectors, but the current
registration system is burdensome, complex and lengthy. China and India have screening and
approval procedures. However, since the last half of the nineties, the approval has been almost
automatic in an increasing number of sectors.

Belgium does not apply mandatory performance requirements in its FDI system.
However, performance requirements can be linked to incentives but under the same
conditions as local investors. Japan does not apply performance requirements either, save in a
few restricted sectors. Ghana’s system applies several entry conditions and performance
requirements such as a minimum capital requirement, compulsory employment of at least ten
Ghanaians in the trading sector, an export requirement of 70 percent when the enterprise is
operating in a free zone and a few other requirements.

China’s system has a significant number of such requirements, amongst which, in
function of the specific circumstances: export performance requirements, local content
requirements, technology transfer requirements or hiring of Chinese nationals. India also
applies certain export obligations and local content requirements though limited to a lesser
number of sectors, and does not apply local employment conditions. The Brazilian FDI
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legislation requires that in firms employing three or more persons, locals must constitute at
least two thirds of all employees and receive at least two thirds of the total payroll. An
exception to this rule is made when no Brazilians are available for specialized fields.

In Columbia, it is mandatory to have a local general workforce of 90 percent and 80
percent of the specialists in firms with a workforce of more than 10 persons. A special regime
is applicable in the audiovisual services industry where a restriction on foreign content in
broadcasting applies. More precisely, at least 70 percent of the so-called prime time must be
of local content, and 40 percent the rest of the time. In the UAE there is only mandatory
hiring of locals in a few sectors like the banking industry.

It can thus be observed that the developed countries are located close to the
intersection of the entry procedures axis and the entry conditions and performance
requirements axis. Graph I also demonstrates the trend of relative correlation between both
types of determinants.

A second trend, observable in Graph II, shows the relation between rules restricting
foreign ownership on one hand (y axis), and national provisions excluding FDI in certain
sectors of the host economy and reciprocity requirements on the other hand (x axis).

The more separated from the intersection of both axes, the more the ownership
possibilities of foreign investors are restricted by the country’s laws, or the more sectors are
carved out for FDI.
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The determinant FDI exclusions has been linked with the rules restricting foreign
ownership for the purposes of graph II for reasons highlighted in chapter three, amongst
which is the fact that they overlap occasionally. The determinant of reciprocity requirements
can be considered both as included in the x axis and the y axis because occasionally a national
system restrains foreign ownership of nationals from countries that do not apply the same or a
similar treatment to its nationals, while in other occasions it is de facto FDI for those former
nationals.

Countries that are characterized by a liberal and open FDI system only exceptionally
restrain foreign ownership and only exclude FDI in a limited number of sectors. In Belgium,
for example, only Belgians and EU-nationals can effectuate public works, and some sectors
such as airport operation, national railways and public transport, are still legal monopolies and
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as such are not accessible. The rules applicable in France are relatively similar as those in
Belgium. In France, apart from the sectors mentioned in the Belgian system, the tobacco
manufacturing and distribution is also a legal monopoly. Ghana excludes foreign investors of
small-scale trading, taxi services if the fleet does not reach ten taxi vehicles, beauty salons and
barber shops by virtue of its general FDI law, i.e., the Ghana Investment Promotion Act, and
several other sectors such as small-scale mining by virtue of sector-specific laws. Several
sectors are excluded also in the regime of the UAE, and oil production in the latter country is a
legal monopoly of that State, although partially accessible to private investors, including
foreigners. A recent regulatory evolution towards more openness took place in the latter
country when in January 2005 the telecommunications sector opened to private investment,
partially accessible to foreign investors.

The regime in India has already been discussed chapter III in order to illustrate the
determinants used in graph II. In short, foreign investment is prohibited in various sectors and
sub-sectors and in several others a cap on foreign equity ownership applies. In the last several
years Brazil opened several sectors formerly carved out for FDI. The sectors concerned,
moreover, are of considerable importance: fossil oil, telecommunications, mining, power
generation, internal transport and media companies. The opening of those sectors, however,
was sometimes accompanied by the application of a cap on foreign equity ownership.
Amongst the sectors that presently remain closed for FDI are nuclear energy, health services,
rural property, fishing, postal services, aviation and aerospace. Columbia only excludes
foreign investment from the sectors related to the national security of the country, the disposal
of hazardous waste products and commercial ships registered in Columbia.
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In Belgium, no restriction applies on foreign asset or real estate ownership nor
restrictions on equity ownership except in a few sectors, such as aviation, inland shipping and
Belgian registered ships. Moreover, as a result of EU-law, citizens of the Member States are
not considered as foreign investors for the purposes of those restrictions. In the UAE only
Emiratis are permitted to own land. The establishment by the Emirate of Dubai and a few
other Emirates of a so-called free hold real estate ownership system in designated zones does
not constitutes a significant attenuation of this FDI barrier. Substantial equity ownership
restrictions apply in the Emirates. The general rule is that Emiratis have to own as a minimum
51 percent of the foreign direct investment entity. However, the distribution of the profits
does not necessarily have to take the same proportions. The same cap of 49 percent of foreign
ownership applies to industrial projects with the additional condition that the project has to be
managed by an Emirati or by a board of directors composed by a majority of Emiratis. There
are exceptions to the general rule, the most representative of which is the possibility to own
up to 100 percent of the equity of foreign direct investment entities in so-called free zones
such as the Jebel Ali Free Zone of the Emirate of Dubai. In Ghana, the general rule is the
absence of a requirement to have a local partner or partners. However, foreign equity caps
apply in a certain number of sectors such as a cap of 75 percent on foreign ownership in the
fishing sector, a cap of 60 percent in the insurance sector, and a cap of 10 percent per foreign
investor and of 74 percent of foreign ownership in general of a security listed on the Ghana
Stock Exchange.

In China, foreign investors can not own land as a result of the legal system providing
that only the public can own land. The Indian system is presumably one of the most hybrid
from this perspective and has been discussed extensively in Chapter III. Japan only applies
foreign equity caps in a few areas such as a restriction of 20 percent in the broadcasting
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sector. Columbia has a similar system to Japan, with no foreign equity caps save in a few
sectors such as broadcasting.

It can be observed that many of the restrictions and exclusions in the countries that are
least restrictive find their rationales in national security concerns or superior national interests,
while in other countries those rules are based on broader grounds; and economic
protectionism can be the major rationale for most of the barriers. Those countries that apply a
more significant number of sector-specific FDI exclusions often also tend to apply more
restrictions on foreign ownership.

The trends which have been defined in the interrelation between FDI determinants are
not exhaustive, and once again it has to be stressed that the exceptions confirm the trends. The
analysis of the different determinants and the relative coherence in their interrelations also
enables a distinction between groups of countries. It is indeed clear that the counties that
count among those with the most liberal and open investment systems are generally developed
countries and more specifically the Member States of the OECD. However, even within the
club of rich countries the extent of openness towards FDI inflows varies sometimes
significantly, though not as substantially as the gap existing between the average hospitability
of OECD-countries and the average in developing and emerging countries. For example,
Belgium is more hospitable towards FDI than Canada where, for example, investments over $
5 million are usually subject to a review procedure in order to ensure that significant
investments benefit Canadians, and also more FDI hospitable than Australia, where a similar
system enables the government to prohibit foreign investment when considered to be rather
damaging to the national interest. Clearly, the regimes of both Canada and Australia are
substantially more open than countries such as India, UAE or China. However, the graphs also
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made clear that several developing and emerging countries have an FDI system which is as
open as some OECD countries, at least with regard to certain FDI determinants. The extent to
which the regimes of the non-OECD countries will further approach the liberal and open FDI
models of their OECD counterparts, remains to be seen.
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